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NOTE
FROZEN IN TIME: THE ANTARCTIC MINERAL
RESOURCE CONVENTION
The final text of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities (the Convention) was adopted on June
1, 1988.1 Representatives of the twenty decisionmaking parties to
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (the Treaty) 2 negotiated and drafted
the Convention. The Treaty, as well as the agreements and recommendations that have arisen under its auspices, are known collectively as the Antarctic Treaty System (the Treaty System). For the
past thirty years, the Treaty System has been the governing international legal regime in Antarctica. 3
The Convention's drafters intended to establish an administrative system to regulate the exploitation of mineral resources on the
Antarctic Continent and adjacent continental shelf.4 Somewhat
ironically, the proposed Convention ignited an international debate
which has rendered uncertain the future of Antarctic mineral re-

1 27 I.L.M. 868 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention was opened for signature on November 25, 1988. States that participated in its negotiation and drafting are
entitled to sign, subject to domestic ratification. In November 1989, the Convention
was opened for accession by all states which were contracting parties to the Antarctic
Treaty. See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
2 Also referred to as The Treaty of Washington, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,
T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter Treaty or Antarctic Treaty].
3 See generally THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME (Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K.
Chopra eds. 1988).
4
Mineral resource exploitation in Antarctica is not economically feasible at this
time. Commentators disagree, however, as to the continent's future mineral potential.
See F.G. Larminie, Mineral Resources: Commercial Prospectsfor Antarctic Minerals, in THE
ANTARCTIC TRAT

REGIME 176 (Gillian D. Triggs ed. 1987). Larminie concludes that

the commercial prospects for Antarctic minerals are "virtually nil." Id. at 176; see also
Franz Tessensohn, Present Knowledge of Non-Living Resource in the Antarctic, Possibilitiesfor
their Exploitation and Scientific Perspectives, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE 189 (Rildiger Wolfirum
ed. 1984); Franz Tessensohn, Antarctic Mineral Resources: Tell Us Where the Riches Are....
in ANrARCTIC CHALLENGE 1119 (Riidiger Wolfrum ed. 1986);James H. Ziimberge, Potential Mineral Resource Availability and Possible Environment Problems in Antarctica, in THE NEW
NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES 115, 116 (Jonathan I. Charney ed. 1982)
[hereinafter COMMON SPACES] ("While a potential mineral resource may exist on the
Antarctic continent, no mineral deposits of economic value in the present marketplace
are known.").
Offshore drilling for hydrocarbons is considered to be the most promising area for
development. See id at 127-28. Scientific data with respect to the mineral resource potential of Antarctic land areas remain largely inconclusive. Id. at 124-27; see Larminie,
supra, at 180-81.
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source exploitation itself.5 This debate not only casts in doubt
whether the Convention will ever enter into force, 6 but also raises
serious questions regarding the legitimacy of the current legal regime governing Antarctica.
Both the Treaty and the Convention invite universal participation, and claim to further the interests of the international community.7 In reality, however, limits on meaningful participation in the
Treaty System regime8 and the self-selecting membership of its
decisionmaking bodies9 reveal that the Treaty System is based upon
outmoded principles of exclusive territorial sovereignty. 10 As the
international community has become increasingly interested in Antarctica, due in large part to the potential economic benefits of its
mineral resources, this exclusive jurisdiction has been the subject of
growing criticism by states outside the Treaty System. 1I
This Note proposes an alternative legal regime that incorpo12
rates the basic principles of the "common heritage of mankind."'
Such a regime would recognize the international community's
vested interest in Antarctica by allowing for truly universal participation. The common heritage principle was embodied in two recent international agreements providing for the internationalization
5 Australia and France have proposed a permanent ban on mining in Antarctica.
New Zealand, with the support of five European nations, advocates an Antarctic "world
park." The Antarctic: An Ice Point, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 24, 1990, at 46. The United
States has favored a moratorium on mining, without deciding its exact duration. U.S.
Seeks Moratorium on Antarctic Minerals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at A10, col. 4; see Catherine Redgwell, Current Developments: InternationalLaw--Antarctica, 39 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
474 (1990).
6 To enter into force, the Convention must be ratified by each of the 20 decisionmaking parties to the Treaty. As of February 7, 1991, 16 states had signed the Convention. None had ratified it. Telephone interview with Mary Brandt, Treaty Analyst, U.S.
Dep't of State (Feb. 7, 1991).
7
Treaty, supra note 2, at preamble ("it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not
become the scene or object of international discord"); Convention, supra note 1, at preamble ("the effective regulation of Antarctic mineral resource activities is in the interest
of the international community as a whole").
8 See infra text accompanying notes 220-29.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 72-76, 94-110.
10 Territorial sovereignty is the general principle underlying the traditional state
system. Territorial sovereignty grants a nation-state "the competence to prescribe and
apply law to persons, things, and events within its territorial domain to the exclusion of
other states." LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAw 117 (1989); see GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 51-54 (6th ed. 1976); MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 240-42
(1986).
11 Organized political opposition to the Treaty System has been led by those lessdeveloped states often identified as the "Group of 77." See Moritaka Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 275 (1986); M.C.W. Pinto, The
InternationalCommunity and Antarctica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 475 (1978).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 271-310.
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of areas beyond national jurisdiction, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS III),l1 and the "Moon
Treaty" of 1979.14 Although neither attempt at implementation of
the common heritage principle has been completely successful, this
Note contends that this failure resulted from the institutionalization
of political and economic principles not essential to the common
heritage doctrine.
Section I of this Note provides a brief history of human activity
in Antarctica, and describes the main features of both the Antarctic
Treaty and the Mineral Resources Convention. Section II considers
the need for authority in international law for any exercise ofjurisdiction, and assesses legal doctrines that may support the exercise
ofjurisdiction over Antarctica. Section III assesses the operation of
the Treaty System over the past three decades, emphasizing the System's legal and political shortcomings. Finally, Section IV proposes
a modification of the Treaty System to provide for broader and
more open participation by the international community, incorporating the basic principles of the common heritage doctrine.
I
BACKGROUND

A.

Early History of Antarctica

Substantial human activity in Antarctica began during the nineteenth century, 1 5 when Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and
France undertook a series of exploratory expeditions. 1 6 Apart from
exploration, the main activity during this period consisted of commercial whaling and sealing voyages in the ocean surrounding Antarctica.1 7 Whaling from mainland shore stations commenced
13 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS III]. See infra notes 283-305 and accompanying text.
14 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, openedforsignatureDec. 10, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (1979) (entered into force
July 11, 1984). See infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text; see also Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
15 Captain James Cook circumnavigated the Antarctic Continent from 1773 to
1774. Cook, who was less than overwhelmed by the magnitude of his accomplishment,
wrote of Antarctica: "I make bold to declare that the world will derive no benefit from
it." PHILIP W. QUIGG, ANTARCTICA: THE CONTINUING EXPERIMENT 3 (1985). The mainland itself was not reported sighted until 1820. The first sighting has been claimed by
Bellingshausen of Russia, Bransfield of the United Kingdom, and Palmer of the United
States. F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND PoLrrICs 2 (1982).
16

ROBERT

Fox,

ANTARCTICA AND THE SOUTH ATLANnic: DIscovERY, DEVELOPMENT

AND DisPurE 97-98 (1985).
17 Id. at 97. The primary quarry consisted of blue, fin, right, and sperm whales, and
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around the turn of the century, and led to the establishment of temporary settlements.
After World War II, scientific research became the predominant
activity in Antarctica. 18 Technological developments in transportation and communication facilitated the establishment of large-scale,
permanent scientific research stations. 19 During the International
Geophysical Year (IGY), 20 an international research program which
ran from July 1957 to December 1958, twelve countries established
some sixty staffed bases to gather scientific data. 2 1 This emphasis
upon scientific research in Antarctica continued through the 1960s

and

1970s.22

Beginning in the mid-1970s, and increasingly in the past decade, the focus in Antarctica has shifted from pure scientific research
to the possibility of mineral resource exploitation.2 3 The 1973 oil
embargo and the consequent desire of the industrialized nations to
secure new sources of energy provided the impetus behind this
25
change in focus. 2 4 In addition to potential hydrocarbon deposits,
geologists have speculated that the Antarctic continent may contain
exploitable quantities of minerals such as iron, copper, molybdenum, chromium, platinum, nickel, zinc, tin, silver, and gold.2 6 Such
speculation, however, remains largely unsubstantiated.2 7 Finally,
there has been growing acceptance of the once-ridiculed concept of
during the brief interval between their discovery and depletion, colonies of fur seals. J.
A. Gulland, The Management Regime for Living Resources, in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME,
supra note 3, at 219, 221.
18

FRANcIsco ORREGO VICUNA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOITATION: THE EMERGING

LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3 (1988).
19 F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 3.
20 In 1950 a group of American scientists suggested that a coordinated international polar research program be undertaken, initially conceived as the Third International Polar Year. This later evolved into the International Geophysical Year (IGY),
administered by the International Council of Scientific Unions. The goal of the IGY was
to contribute to scientific knowledge of uniquely polar phenomena such as ice sheets,
the auroras, and effects on global weather patterns, as well as general phenomena such
as cosmic rays, the ionosphere, and ocean dynamics. P. QUIGG, supra note 15, at 9-10.
21 Id at9.
22
23

Id at 10.

F. VICUNA, supra note 18, at 3. The emphasis upon mineral resource activities is
new, but Sir Douglas Mawson's Australian expedition of 1929-1930 demonstrated an
early interest by investigating the resource potential of Antarctica. GUSTAV SMEDAL, AcoUISITION OF SoVERIGNTY OVER POLAR AREAS 6-7 (1931).
24 Francesco Francioni, Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL
INT'L Lj. 163, 164 (1986). Changes in political and economic circumstances in the years
since the oil crisis have ameliorated energy concerns to a certain extent. It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that this respite will last only until a sense of urgency
returns sometime in the foreseeable future.
25 See supra note 4.
26 Ziimberge, supra note 4, at 125.
27
See supra note 4.
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towing Antarctic icebergs to arid regions as a source of fresh
28
water.
B.

Debate over the Legal Status of Antarctica

The legal debate over the status of Antarctica began around the
turn of the century and for several decades was characterized by
broad disagreement. At one extreme, a number of legal commentators advocated the exercise of traditional territorial sovereignty over
Antarctica. 29 Those maintaining this position asserted that legal title to Antarctica derived either from an act of acquisition, or from
some other claim of right.8 0 Great Britain made the first public territorial claim in 1908. 3 1 Following Great Britain, six other states

made territorial claims: New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Austra32
lia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940), and Argentina (1942).
Other commentators refused to recognize the validity of territorial claims in Antarctica, and during the early years those who favored some form of international ownership dominated the
debate. 8 As early as 1910, the highly respected commentator, T.
W. Balch, suggested that the known Antarctic territories should
34
"become common possessions of all of the family of nations."
The current Treaty regime incorporates aspects of both territorial
sovereignty and international ownership, yet as the debate has
reintensified in recent years, sentiments are again polarized around
the two extremes.
C.

The Antarctic Treaty System

The current legal regime in Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty
System, is comprehensive in scope, dealing with such issues as sovereignty, 5 civil and criminal jurisdiction,3 6 conservation, 7 military
28 Zimberge, supra note 4, at 129. The First International Conference on Iceberg
Utilization, sponsored by the National Science Foundation, produced a cautiously
favorable report. Id.; see Peter Schwerdtfeger, Antarctic Icebergs as PotentialSources of Water
and Energy, in ANTARCMC CHALLENGE II, supra note 4, at 377. In terms of potential, it

should be noted that Antarctica contains three-fourths of the earth's fresh water. P.
QUIGG,supra note 15, at 35.
29 See G.SMEDAL, supra note 23; Laura H. Martin, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 29J. GEOGRAPHY 112, 119 (1930).

See infra text accompanying notes 132-84.
F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 2.
32 Patrick T. Bergin, Antarctica, The Antarctic Treaty Regime, and Legal and Geopolitical
Implications of NaturalResource Explorationand Exploitation, 4 FLA. INT'L L.J. 3, 3 n.8 (1988).
33 See, e.g., id. at 6.
34 Thomas Willing Balch, The Arctic andAntarctic Regions and the Law of Nations, 4 AM.
J. INf'L L. 265, 275 (1910).
30
31

35
36
37

Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV; see infra text accompanying notes 63-71, 230-37.

Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII.
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, openedfor
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matters, 3 8 and ownership of Antarctic resources.3 9 The Treaty System was, however, initially conceived as a more limited undertaking.
The original Treaty had relatively narrow objectives, 40 primarily addressing concerns which arose during the intensification of scientific
41
activity in the 1950s.
The cooperative international efforts under the auspices of the
42
IGY led directly to the creation of the Antarctic Treaty. Led by
the Soviet Union, 4 3 the twelve IGY participants" decided to expand
their presence on the Antarctic Continent upon conclusion of that
program. Accordingly, a mutual recognition arose as to the need
for a legal regime to formalize the cooperative arrangements that
had proved effective during the IGY.4 5 At the invitation of the
United States, 4 6 the twelve states undertook a series of discussions
that culminated in the International Conference on Antarctica, held
in Washington in 1959. 4 7 This meeting produced the Antarctic
Treaty, which was signed on December 1, 1959.48 Following ratification by all twelve original parties, the Treaty entered into force on
49
June 23, 1961.
In addition to the Treaty itself, the Treaty System participants
have produced over 150 related agreements. 50 Most of these agreements concern either scientific or environmental matters, 5 1 and
many were promulgated in the form of nonbinding recommendasignature May 20, 1980, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force Apr. 7,
1982); Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals,June 1, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 441,
T.I.A.S. No. 882; Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora,
June 2-13, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. No. 6058.
38
Treaty, supra note 2, art. I ("There shall be prohibited ... any measures of a
military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.").
39
Convention, supra note 1.
40
See infra text accompanying notes 55-57.
41
See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
42
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
43
F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 4.
44 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Tore Gjelsvik, Scientific Research and Cooperationin Antarctica, in ANTARcTIc CHALLENGE, supra note 4,
at 42. For a list of the seven claimant states, see supra text accompanying note 32.
45
Finn Sollie, The Development of the Antarctic Treaty System- Trends and Issues, in
ANTARcTIc CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 17; see F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 4.
46
United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica, 38 DEP'T ST. BULL. 910, 911 (1958).
47 Frank C. Alexander, Jr., A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic Resource Problem, 33
U. MIAMI L. REv. 371, 378-79 (1978).
48 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
49 See Treaty, supra note 2.
50 THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME, supra note 4, at 55.
51 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The full texts of agreements adopted
by Treaty parties through 1981 are collected in I W.M. BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: A COLLErION OF INTER-STATE AND NATIONAL DOCUMENTS (1982).
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tions adopted at periodic meetings of Treaty members. 5 2 The most
recent component of the Treaty System is the Mineral Resources
53
Convention.
1. The Antarctic Treaty
a. Substantive Provisions of the Treaty
Consistent with its origins,M4 the Treaty has two main objectives: restricting Antarctica to peaceful uses, and promoting scientific research. 5 5 Article I provides that "Antarctica shall be used for
peaceful purposes only." 5 6 Article II states that "[flreedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end
• shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present
57
Treaty."
The substantive provisions of the Treaty elaborate upon these
two stated objectives. To ensure that Antarctica "shall not become
the scene or object of international discord," 58 the Treaty prohibits
military bases and fortifications, 59 and explicitly bans nuclear explosions and nuclear waste disposal. 60 In the interests of economy and
efficiency, the parties agreed to exchange information and personnel and to cooperate in planning scientific research. 6 ' To ensure
the effective operation of the Treaty, the parties have the right to
62
designate observers to monitor compliance.
Article IV, dealing with territorial claims, 63 has critical signifi52 The Treaty provides that parties shall meet "at suitable intervals and places, for
the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to
their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the
Treaty." Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX(l). See Rules of Procedure of Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meetings, adopted on 10 July 1961, Rule 23, reprinted in 1 W. BusH, supra
note 51, at 117-18.
53
See infra text accompanying notes 82-112.
54 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
55 See John J. Barcel6, III, The InternationalLegal Regime for Antarctica, 19 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 155, 157 (1986).
56 Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, para. 1.
57 Id art. II.
58 IaL at preamble.
59 Id art. I, para. 1.
60
Id. art. V.
61
Id art. III.
62 Id. art. VII.
63
See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. The seven individual state claims together cover approximately 85% of the land area of Antarctica. Three of these claims,
those of the United Kingdom, Chile, and Argentina, partly overlap one another. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union, not having made formalized claims, reserve the right to do so in the future. Barcel6, supra note 55, at 156-57. The status of the
United States and the Soviet Union is included within the Treaty's reference to states
having a "basis of claim." Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. I (c).

1991]

NOTE-ANTARCTIC CONVENTION

729

cance for the operation of the entire Treaty System. Unfortunately,
no general agreement exists as to the exact manner in which Article
IV operates. 64 Paragraph one of Article IV states that the Treaty
does not prejudice any pre-existing claim, or basis of claim, 65 to territorial sovereignty. It also states that the position of parties who do
not recognize the territorial claims shall not be prejudiced. Paragraph two states that no new claims may be asserted while the
Treaty is in force, and that no acts occurring during such time may
66
constitute a basis for any future claim.
Article IV thus neither recognizes nor disavows existing territorial claims; it merely reinforces existing ambiguity. Each claimant
state asserts that its own claim is valid, but not all claimant states
recognize the validity of other claims. 67 Furthermore, the nonclaimant states do not recognize the validity of any claim. 68 Since the
positions of claimant and nonclaimant states are mutually exclusive,
it is unclear which situation Article IV preserves. 69 Despite this ambiguity, 70 Article IV allows the parties to cooperate with respect to
64
One commentator has aptly characterized Article IV of the Treaty as casting
Antarctic territorial sovereignty into "a purgatory of ambiguity." J. Michael Marcoux,
Natural ResourceJurisdictionon the Antarctic ContinentalMargin, I1 VA.J. INT'L L. 374, 379
(1971).
65
"Basis of claim" refers to the position taken by the United States and the Soviet
Union. See supra note 63.
66 Article IV reads in its entirety:
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights
of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis
of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether
as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or
otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis
of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force
shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is
in force.
Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV.
67
Chile does not recognize the claims of Argentina or the U.K.; Argentina does not
recognize the claims of Chile or the U.K.; and the U.K. does not recpgnize the claims of
Argentina or Chile. See Barcel6, supra note 55, at 156-57.
68 Id at 157.
69 See F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 104-05. For a thorough discussion of the ambiguous content of Article IV, see id at 104-10.
70 It has been suggested that the ambiguity inherent in Article IV is both functional
and deliberate. As one commentator asserted, "Article IV was deliberately drafted to
enable States with conflicting interests to adopt differing views as to its meaning." Id at
104. During the United States Senate's ratification deliberations, Senator Gruening's
sentiments regarding Article IV, as paraphrased by Auburn, were that "it stated what it
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their common objectives without compromising their strongly held,
mutually exclusive positions on sovereignty. 71 In the spirit of cooperation, Article IV thus represents an agreement to disagree.
b.

Membership

The Treaty has a two-tiered membership structure. Each
Treaty party is either a filly participating, decisionmaking consultative party, or a nonvoting, nonconsultative party. 72 Article IX provides that, in addition to the twelve original parties, any other
acceding state may become a consultative party and participate in
consultative meetings "during such time 73 as [it] demonstrates its
interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research
activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the
dispatch of a scientific expedition." 74 Only through representation
at these consultative meetings, however, may a party participate in
policymaking decisions. 75 Furthermore, only the consultative parties may vote on modifications or amendments to the Treaty itself.76
Any United Nations member state may become a nonconsultadid not mean, and did not state what it did mean." Id. For a further discussion of the
mechanics of Article IV, see infra text accompanying notes 230-37.
71
One commentator has described Article IV as "[t]he cornerstone of the Antarctic
Treaty ....

Without that article, the Treaty would not have come into existence."

Rolph Trolle-Anderson, The Antarctic Scene: Legal and PoliticalFacts, in THE ANTARcTIC
TREATY REGIME, supra note 4, at 59.
72
Treaty parties are also referred to by commentators as "contracting parties."
The Treaty itself does not explicitly distinguish between consultative and nonconsultative parties. Rather, the Treaty refers to all acceding states as "Contracting Parties,"
some of which are allowed to participate in consultative meetings. Article IX creates the
distinction by limiting to certain parties the right to appoint representatives for consultative meetings. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX, para. 2.
73
The Treaty discriminates between permanent consultative parties, comprised of
the twelve original signatories, and temporary consultative parties, comprising the states
subsequently attaining consultative status. Whereas the latter may hold consultative status only "during such time as" they are active in Antarctica, permanent consultative
parties are under no obligation to maintain their activities, and cannot lose their consultative status. See W. BUSH, supra note 51, at 83.
74 Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX, para. 2 (footnote added). The Treaty itself does not
establish a procedure by which nonconsultative parties may be granted consultative status. Such a procedure was not created until 1977, when Poland became the first state to
attain consultative status. W. BUSH, supra note 51, at 92. Pursuant to this procedure,
applications are examined to determine whether the applicant has complied with the
requirements of Article IX, and must be unanimously approved by the current consultative parties in order for consultative status to be granted. FinalReport of the FirstSpecial
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, London, Concerning the Proceduresby which Acceding States
May Become ConsultativeParties,July 29, 1977, reprinted in W. BUSH, supra note 51, at 33137; see F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 147-53.
75 See infra text accompanying notes 220-25.
76 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII, para. 1(a). For a list of specific privileges accorded
consultative parties see W. BUSH, supra note 51, at 84.
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tive party by acceding to the Treaty2 7 The benefits of nonconsultative status, however, are unclear. Nonconsultative parties are bound
by Treaty obligations, but are denied meaningful participation in
the decisionmaking process. 78 The history of the Treaty System
suggests that the sole incentive for acceding to the Treaty as a nonconsultative party is the expectation of later attaining consultative
79

status.
In addition to the twelve original parties to the Treaty,8 0 fourteen states have gained consultative status: Ecuador, Finland, the
Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Peru, Spain, Sweden, Poland,
Germany s8 Brazil, India, China, Uruguay, and Italy. Currently,
there are eight nonconsultative parties: Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Papua New Guinea, and
Rumania.
2.

The Mineral Resources Convention

As interest in the mineral resource potential of Antarctica
gained momentum during the 1970s, the general outlines of a formal regime to govern exploitation gradually took shape.8 2 In 1982,
representatives of the consultative parties gathered at the Fourth
Special Consultative Meeting and began work on a comprehensive
mineral resources regime. The deliberations of the consultative
parties during the next six years resulted in adoption of the Convention, which was opened for signature at Wellington, New Zealand on
November 25, 1988. The Convention will not enter into force until
77 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII, para. 1. Any state that is not a member of the
United Nations must be unanimously approved by the consultative parties before it may
accede to the Treaty. Id.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 220-25.
79 F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 171. Only states which are currently parties to the
Treaty can apply for consultative status. L
80 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
81 Both East and West Germany gained consultative status independently. As of
October 3, 1990, their status merged.
82 The potential for mineral resource activities in Antarctica was formally addressed
at a meeting of experts sponsored by the Nansen Foundation in 1973. Nansen Foundation, Antarctic Resources, Report from the Meeting of Experts, May 30-June 10, 1973,

reprintedin U.S. Antarctic Policy: U.S. Policy with Regard to MineralExplorationand Exploitation
in the Antarctic: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oceans and InternationalEnvironment of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1975). The basic principles

for an administrative regime were elaborated at the Special Preparatory Meeting of consultative parties, held in Paris in 1976. This set of principles was adopted in Recommendation IX-1 of the consultative parties. Report and Recommendations of the Ninth
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, London, Sept. 19-Oct. 7, 1977, reprintedin W.
BUsH, supra note 51, at 337, 343-45. See generally Christopher C. Joyner, The Antarctic

MineralsNegotiatingProcess, 81 AM.J. INV'L L. 888 (1987) (analyzing the process by which
concerned states have pursued national priorities within the decisionmaking framework
and context of the Antarctic minerals negotiations).
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sixteen consultative parties have either ratified or acceded to it.83
a. Objectives of the Convention
The central objective of the Convention is to regulate Antarctic
85
84
mineral resource activities, including prospecting, exploration,
and development.8 6 The Convention seeks to provide an orderly
administrative system to prevent conflicts among those undertaking
mineral resource exploitation,8 7 to promote cooperation among the
parties, and to create and enforce adequate safeguards to protect
the fragile Antarctic environment.8 8 The Convention also requires
that all mineral resource activities within Antarctica8 9 comply with
the Convention. 90
b. Membership in the Convention
The Convention is open for accession by any party to the
Convention, supra note 1, art. 63. The 16 must include each of the claimant
states. In addition, at least five developing and 11 industrialized nations must accede to
the Convention. Id.; see R.W. Bentham, Antarctica: A MineralsRegime, 8J. ENERGY & NAT.
83

RESOURCES

L. 120, 127 (1990).

"Prospecting" is defined as "activities, including logistic support, aimed at identifying areas of mineral resource potential for possible exploration and development."
Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 8. Prospecting does not require prior authorization, but must be conducted in compliance with the Convention. Furthermore, prospecting does not confer rights to mineral resources. Id. art. 37, para. 1.
85
"Exploration" refers to activities aimed at "identifying and evaluating specific
mineral resource occurrences or deposits." Id. art. 1, para. 9. Exploration requires a
permit from the appropriate Regulatory Committee, which then prescribes "the specific
terms and conditions for exploration and development." Id art. 47.
86
"Development" consists of "activities, including logistic support, which... are
aimed at or associated with exploitation of specific mineral resource deposits." Id art. 1,
para. 10. Development requires a permit issued by the Regulatory Committee. Id. arts.
53-54.
87
The preamble declares that Antarctica "shall not become the scene or object of
international discord." Id. at preamble.
88
"[IThe protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated
ecosystems must be a basic consideration in decisions taken on possible Antarctic mineral resource activities." 1I; see E. Paul Newman, The Antarctic Mineral Resources Convention: Developments from the October 1986 Tokyo Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties, 15 DEN.J. INr'L L. & POL'Y 421, 426 (1987).
89 The Convention applies to all land areas and ice shelves south of 60 degrees
South Latitude, and to the "seabed and subsoil of adjacent offshore areas up to the deep
seabed." Convention, supra note I, art. 5, para. 2. The 60 degree boundary is a political
one, corresponding to the northern limit of the territorial claims. F. AUBURN, supra note
15, at 130. This political boundary lies to the north of the Antarctic Circle, yet well
south of the geographically and scientifically significant Antarctic Convergence, the circumpolar zone where cold Antarctic waters and warmer northern waters meet. Christopher C. Joyner, The Antarctic Legal Regime: An Introduction, in THE ArrAnarxc LEGAL
REGIME, supra note 3, at 1.
90
"No Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be conducted except in accorConvention,
dance with this Convention and measures in effect pursuant to it ....
supra note 1, art. 3.
84
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Treaty. 9 1 Since membership in the Treaty is open to all without significant restriction, 92 the only requirement for admittance to the
Convention is a willingness to accede to the Treaty. However, significant participation in decisionmaking and policy matters depends
upon satisfaction of the requirements for obtaining membership in
the Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission. 93
c. Administrative Structure
The Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission (the Resources
Commission)9 4 is the main legislative and executive body created by
the Convention, having exclusive competence to decide matters of
policy. Its functions include supervising scientific research,
designating areas for development, adopting environmental protection measures, setting standards for prospecting, deciding budgetary matters, allocating revenue, adopting measures relating to the
dissemination of data, and ensuring compliance with the substantive
provisions of the Convention. 9 5
The initial membership of the Resources Commission will consist of those parties who were Antarctic Treaty consultative parties
as of the date the Convention was opened for signature. 96 In addition, any other party that is "actively engaged in substantial scientific, technical or environmental research ... directly relevant to
decisions about Antarctic mineral resource activities,"' 9 7 or who is
sponsoring exploration or development, 98 may apply for membership in the Resources Commission. The application of a nonconsultative party to the Treaty requires the unanimous approval of the
current Resources Commission. The application of a consultative
party requires only two-thirds approval. 99
The Convention also provides for the establishment of an indeterminate number of Regulatory Committees. 10 0 Each committee
has an executive function including responsibility for regulating and
monitoring mineral resource activities within a particular develop91
92

Id art. 61.

See supra text accompanying notes 72-81.
See id.
94 Convention, supra note 1, arts. 18-22.
95 Id art. 21.
96 Id. art. 18, para. 2(a). The Convention was opened for signature on November
25, 1988. On that date the following states were consultative parties to the Treaty: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, France, East Germany, West Germany,
India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.
97 Id. art. 18, para. 2(b).
98 Id art. 18, para. 2(c).
99 Id. art. 18, para. 4.
100 Id arts. 29-32.
93
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ment area.10 1 A primary function of each Regulatory Committee is
to consider applications for exploration and development permits
and to issue such permits as it deems appropriate. 10 2 Each Regulatory Committee must have ten members, with the Resources Commission determining the exact composition.' 0 3 However, the
Convention requires that the state or states asserting a territorial
claim within the relevant area be represented. 10 4 In addition, the
two members asserting a basis for claim' 0 5 must be on every Regulatory Committee. 10 6 The remaining seats must be occupied by Resources Commission members selected by the Resources
Commission. In total, each Regulatory Committee must represent
four claimant and six nonclaimant states. 10 7 Furthermore, at least
three out of the ten members must be representatives of developing
8
countries. 10
The Convention provides for two bodies whose membership is
open to all parties: the Scientific, Technical and Environmental Advisory Committee, 0 9 and the Special Meeting of Parties. 110 These
bodies serve a purely advisory function, with competence to produce only nonbinding recommendations. Ultimate decisionmaking
authority remains with the Resources Commission and the Regulatory Committees.
d.

Finance

The operating budget will be financed by permit fees and levies
imposed upon Operators"' as determined by the Resources Com101 The Resources Commission is to designate such development areas. Id. art. 21.
Each area must constitute a "coherent unit for the purposes of resource management."
Id art. 41, para. 1 (a).
102
An earlier version of the Convention granted this power of approval to the Commission, whereas the final version merely gives the Commission a right of review. Draft
Antarctic Minerals Regime, reprintedin GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, THE FUTURE OF THE
ANTARCTIC (1985).
103 Convention, supra note I, art. 29, para. 2.
104 Id. art. 29, para. 2(a).
105
The United States and the Soviet Union. Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. I(c).
106 The United States and the Soviet Union would be granted the widest representation of any party. The justification for this priority is unclear.
107
Convention, supra note 1,art. 29, para. 2(c). Important decisions are to be made
by a qualified majority, requiring two-thirds approval by members present and voting,
including simple majorities of both claimant and nonclaimant members. Id. art. 32,
para. 1. This voting procedure gives claimant states a de facto veto, assuming they vote
as a bloc.
108 Id. art. 29, para. 3(b). The Convention seeks to ensure "adequate and equitable
representation of developing country members of the Commission, having regard to the
overall balance between developed and developing country members of the Commission." Id The Convention does not provide its own definition of "developing country."
109 Id. arts. 23-27.
110 Id. art. 28.
111 An Operator is any individual or organization "which is undertaking Antarctic
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mittee. Such revenues will fund the cost of administering the Convention. 112 The Convention does not require Operators to share
profits from mineral resource development, and does not provide
any form of direct financial benefit for either parties or nonparties.
II
ABSENCE OF AUTHOR=rY TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION IN
ANTARCTICA

A precondition to the existence of any legal order is recognized
authority. Whether the authority comes from a formalized "rule of
1 14
recognition,"' 1 3 or from a fluid set of shared community values,
the existence of some basic norm from which all valid legal principles originate distinguishes a legal order from a system based upon
the arbitrary exercise of power. 1 15 In international law the fundamental source of authority is consensus in the recognition of the
legitimacy of a legal norm. 116 To be consistent with international
law, then, any exercise of state action in the international realm
must be recognized as legitimate. This requirement of recognized
legitimacy applies to the exercise of jurisdiction. 1 7 In order to
mineral resource activities and for which there is a Sponsoring State." Id. art. 1, para.
11.
112 If there is an available surplus, such amount is to be used to promote scientific
research in Antactica. Id. art. 35, para. 7(a). If there is a shortfall, the deficit is to be
made up by equitable contributions from Commission members. Id. art. 35, para. 5.
113

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-119 (1961).

114

Donald W. Grieg, Sovereignty, Territory and the InternationalLawyer's Dilemma, 26

OSGOODE HALL LJ. 127, 131 (1988).

115

See Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory ofLaw, 51 LAw Q.REV. 517 (1935). But seeJOHN

AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832) (stating the positivist view
of law as enforceable command); ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE

RuLE OF LAW 94 (1969) (dismissively characterizing international law as "an attorney's
mantle artfully displayed on the shoulders of arbitrary power").
The analysis contained in this Note rests upon a presumption of the validity of international law as a means of ordering relations among states. It is herein contended
that there is an objective point of reference as between differing interpretations of the
content of international law, and this Note strongly advocates one such interpretation.
It is conceded, however, that there is no such objective reference as between international law per se, and any distinct, alternative conception of international relations (e.g.,
one reconciled to anarchy, or advocating "world law"). The fundamental jurisprudential inquiry into the validity of international law is a worthy, but perilous undertaking,
and it is one which lies beyond the scope of this Note.
Austin contended that law is the enforced command of sovereign to subject. Austin, however, distinguished international law, stating that: "The so called law of nations
consists of opinions or sentiments current among nations generally. It therefore is not
law properly so called." J. AUSTIN, supra, at 142. The Austinian position thus does not
address the content of international law, but rather its fundamental validity.
116 See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 706 AM.J. Ir'L L. 705
(1988); Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of InternationalObligation, 8 VA. J. INr'L L. 300
(1968).
117 The term 'jurisdiction" has been variously defined. In the international context,
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claim the authority to prescribe or enforce a rule of law, an actor
must be able to point to a principle of international law which grants
that authority.
A.

The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Antarctica

There is a continuing debate over whether the Treaty System
purports to exercise jurisdiction over nonparty states in Antarctica.11 8 If the Treaty applies only to Treaty member states and their
nationals," t 9 then nonparty states presumably have no strong
grounds for objecting to the current regime. 120 The Treaty would
not compromise rights of nonparties, and nonparties would not be
constrained by externally imposed obligations. As to the Convention, however, the outcome of this debate is not conclusive.
In contrast to the Treaty, the Convention clearly contemplates
the exercise ofjurisdiction over Antarctica, and over the activities of
122
nonparty states in Antarctica. 12 1 Article 3 of the Convention
states that "[n]o Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be conjurisdiction may be defined as "the capacity of a state under international law to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

20 (1965). More generally, jurisdiction is the "legal authority to
assert control over persons, events and property." Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Bases of
Jurisdiction, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 3
(Cecil J. Olmstead ed. 1984). Higgins's definition is appropriate to the question of the
consultative parties' authority to apply Convention law to Operators undertaking
Antarctic mineral resource activities.
118 For the view that the Treaty System does not bind third parties, see F. AUBURN,
supra note 15, at 115-29; Richard B. Bilder, The Present Legal and PoliticalSituation in AntOF THE UNITED STATES

arctica, in COMMON SPACES, supra note 4, at 173-74. For the contrary view, see W. BUSH,

supra note 51, at 99-100; Patricia Birnie, The Antarctic Regime and Third States, in
ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE II, supra note 4, at 239; Riidiger Wolfrum, Means of EnsuringCom-

pliance with an AntarcticMineral Resources Regime, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE II, supra note 4,
at 177.
119 If the Treaty applied only to member states and their nationals, there would not
necessarily be an exercise of territorial jurisdiction. Treaty provisions, however, may
apply to other than member states. See, e.g., supra note 111. The exercise ofjurisdiction
over nationals of Treaty parties would be based on international legal principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction is derived from the exercising state's sovereign authority within its own territory. SeeJOSEPH
MODESTE SWEENEY, COVEY T. OLIVER & NoYEs E. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 90-118 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM).

120 Nonparty states would presumably object only to the extent that they themselves
sought to exercise exclusive territorial jurisdiction over Antarctica. This, however, is
not in fact the case.
121
See Sollie, supra note 45, at 17, 36 ("The problem with mineral resources is that
they do raise questions of property rights and jurisdiction with direct application to land
and territory in such a way that the question of sovereignty.., must be tackled directly
Article 3 of the Convention is the analog to Article X of the Treaty. Article X
states that "[e]ach of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts ...
to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or
purposes of the present Treaty." Treaty, supra note 2, art. X.
122
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ducted except in accordance with this Convention." 123 The parties
to the Convention thereby assert that they will grant the right to
undertake mineral resource activities only to those who comply with
their terms and conditions. Article 3, of course, assumes that the
right to develop mineral resources is theirs to grant. Furthermore,
it assumes that they may deny that right to any entity unwilling to
124
abide by the terms of the Convention.
The Convention's claim to jurisdiction over all mineral resource activities, including those of nonparty states,125 together with
an administrative structure which limits participation in the decisionmaking process 12 6 necessitates the assertion of some legitimate
basis of authority. Absent such recognized authority, the Conven27
tion is fundamentally inconsistent with international law.'
B.

Possible Sources of Authority

There is no clearly defined set of legal principles that supports
the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. The international lawmaking
process is continuous and fluid, dependent upon consensus to establish its legitimacy.1 28 Although the fluidity of international law
makes its content difficult to define, three generally recognized legal
123
Convention, supra note 1, art 3. Article 3 does not explicitly refer to third parties. When integrated with other provisions of the Convention, however, it is apparent
that Article 3 is intended to bind third parties. The preamble, for example, states that
the parties to the Convention are "[c]onvinced that participation in Antarctic mineral
resource activities should be open to all States which have an interest in such activities
and subscribe to a regime governing them." Id. at preamble.
Article 7 also applies to third parties, requiring the Resources Commission to "draw
the attention of any State which is not a Party to this Convention to any activity...
which, in the opinion of the Commission, affects the implementation of the objectives
and principles of this Convention." Id art. 7, para. 8. This provision concerns the
highly sensitive issue of enforcement, and is not entirely explicit as to the degree of
authority that Convention parties are entitled to exercise over third parties.
124
The Convention states that only Operators are entitled to carry out mineral resource activities. An "Operator" is defined as a party, an agency or instrumentality of a
party, or a "juridical person established under the law of a Party." Id art. 1, para. 11.
The Convention also requires that "Antarctic mineral resource activities, should they
occur, take place in a manner consistent with all the components of the Antarctic Treaty
system and the obligations flowing therefrom." Id art. 2,para. 2. Under this provision
Operators are obligated to comply with the strict environmental protection standards
established under earlier agreements. See agreements cited supra note 37. Operators are
also subject to inspection of "all stations, installations and equipment relating to
Antarctic mineral resource activities ... as well as ships and aircraft supporting such
activities." Inspections are to be carried out by Commission-appointed observers. Convention, supra note 1,art. 12, para. 1. Pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, Operators
are also subject to inspections. Id. art. 11. These provisions impose significant obligations upon any entity undertaking mineral resource activities.
125
See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 94-110.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.

128

See id.
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principles would be most likely to support the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica: territorial sovereignty, t 29 the objective treaty
doctrine, t3 0 and customary international law.' 3 ' For various reasons, however, none of the three justifies the current legal regime
established by the Treaty System.
1.

TerritorialSovereignty

Territorial sovereignty describes a sovereign's competence to
exercise legislative, executive, and judicial functions within its dominion. 13 2 The authority of a territorial sovereign generally is absolute and exclusive, and thus is analogous to the authority that an
owner exercises over his property under private law.' 3 3 Under this
principle, the establishment of a legal order such as the Treaty System, with its imposition of rights and obligations, is within the competence of the territorial sovereign of Antarctica.
Either the claimant states severally, or the Treaty consultative
parties collectively, may assert territorial sovereignty in Antartica. If
each of the individual claimants holds valid tite 3 4 to its claimed
sector, then their participation in the Treaty System provides a legitimate basis for the sovereignty of the consultative parties. The
Treaty System could thus be viewed as a regional arrangement,
competent to determine regional matters of "peace and security" as
provided for in the United Nations Charter.' 3 5
See infra text accompanying notes 132-84.
See infra text accompanying notes 185-95.
See infra text accompanying notes 196-218.
Historically there was a distinction between dominium, the authority which a sovereign exercises over its territory-as-object, and imperium, which is the sovereign's authority over his subjects. Both, however, had a territorial element: The extent of the
sovereign's imperium was delineated by the bounds of his territory. The distinction reappears in the context of Antarctica. The territorial claims asserted during the first half of
this century sought to establish dominium over the claimed area. The authority claimed
by the consultative parties under the Treaty System is not explicitly tied to the territoryas-object, and thus more closely resembles imperium. See F. ViCUNA, supra note 18, at 8084. Under the Convention, however, the consultative parties propose to grant what
amount to ownership rights in Antarctic minerals. By determining rights with respect to
the territory-as-object, the consultative parties are exercising dominium. See infra note
219.
129
130
131
132

133

F.

VICUNA,

supra note 18, at 80. But see R. Y.

JENNINGS, THE

AcQUISMON OF

LAw 4 (1963). Jennings agrees that there are certain
points of similarity, but cautions that "in the context of the society of modern sovereign
States the points of difference are much more significant than any resemblances." Id. at
3.
134
"Title" refers to "the vestitive facts which the law recognizes as creating a right."
R. JENNINGS, supra note 133, at 4. In this case the right created is the right to exercise
sovereignty.
135 Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter recognizes the legitimacy of "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action,
TERRrrORY IN INTERNATIONAL
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Alternatively, if the individual claims are amalgamated, a de
facto condominium may exist.1 3 6 According to this view, the consultative parties are entitled to exercise a form of collective sovereignty over Antarctica by virtue of either their collective activity or
the pooling of their independent claims. 13 7 Declaration of a de
facto condominium 138 has two significant advantages for the consultative parties. First, it would not require the resolution of conflicting territorial claims.' 3 9 Second, even if an individual territorial
claim is not legally strong enough to stand on its own, the consultative parties together would have a consolidated claim to traditional
territorial sovereignty stronger than any other state or group of
states. 140 Assertion of territorial sovereignty, either individually or
as a condominium, must be supported by a principle of territorial
acquisition. To claim territory as part of a sovereign's dominion,
international law must recognize the means of acquisition as legitimate.' 4 1 The category of principles of territorial acquisition is illdefined, but the following survey considers principles that are at
14 2
least colorable as applied to Antarctica.
a. Discovery
According to the discovery principle, valid legal title to territory
and the right to exercise territorial sovereignty accrues from the act
of discovery itself.14 3 While none of the states that currently asserts
provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1. An
example of a regional arrangement is the Organization of American States. See Charter
of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2416, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
136 A condominium in international law is defined as territory "under the joint tenancy of two or more States, these several States exercising sovereignty conjointly over it,
and over the individuals living thereon." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
TREATISE 453 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1962) (emphasis in original). For the purposes of
jurisdiction, a condominium is considered to be a single state. An example of such an
arrangement was the British-French condominium in the New Hebrides. See D.P.
O'Connell, The Condominium of the New Hebrides, 43 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 71 (1968-69).
137 See F. VICUNA, supra note 18, at 320-21; Alexander, supra note 47, at 414-17;
Bilder, supra note 118, at 189-91.
138 Antarctica would be a de facto condominium, as opposed to a general or dejure
condominium, because the Treaty itself does not purport to establish a condominium.
See Bilder, supra note 118, at 190.
139 F. VICUNA, supra note 18, at 320.
140 Bilder, supra note 118, at 189-90.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
142 Omitted are such principles as conquest and cession, which apply only to inhabited lands. See Grieg, supra note 114, at 140. Also omitted is symbolic annexation, which
is closely related to discovery. See F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 9-11. For a discussion of
Chile's claim based on "geological affinity," and the political notion of Pan-American
primacy, see Bergin, supra note 32, at 11-12, 13-14.
143

See

WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

126 (8th ed.

1924) ("In the early days of European exploration it was held, or at least every state
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a claim in Antarctica relies solely on the principle of discovery,
seven states utilize discovery as partial support for their claim:
France, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the Soviet Union.144
Discovery, however, is no longer widely recognized as a sufficient basis for sovereignty. 45 The Island of Palmas case' 46 supports
this view. Island of Palmas involved a dispute between the United
States and the Netherlands, both of which claimed sovereignty over
the Island of Palmas, or Miangas, in the Philippines. The Netherlands based its claim upon actual occupation of the island, whereas
the United States claim derived from an earlier Spanish claim based
on discovery. The Permanent Court of Arbitration held in favor of
the Netherlands, stating that acts of discovery alone, without any
1 47
attempt to exercise control, cannot confer title to territory.
Furthermore, there are a number of practical difficulties with
the discovery principle. For example, its does not set forth which
specific acts constitute discovery. 148 Nor does it provide for the verification of claims, 14 9 or the resolution of disputes between conflicting claims. Finally, discovery alone does not determine the
geographical extent of a claim.150 *
maintained with respect to territories discovered by itself, that the discovery of previously unknown land conferred an absolute title to it upon the state by whose agents the
discovery was made.").
15, at 9.
See id at 6-9 (Auburn relies upon "well-known statements that discovery alone
cannot give sovereignty." Id at 6).
146 Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.) (Apr. 4, 1928) UNRIAA (Vol. II) 829, reprintedin
R. JENNINGS, supra note 133, at 88.
147
Id. at 846. The court emphasized the importance of actual, effective occupation
to a valid claim of sovereignty:
It seems ... incompatible with... positive law that there should be regions which are neither under the effective sovereignty of a State, nor
without a master, but which are reserved for the exclusive influence of
one State, in virtue solely of a title of acquisition which is no longer recognized by existing law, even if such title ever conferred territorial
sovereignty.
Id.
148
Do overflights or offshore sightings of land constitute discovery, or must a physical landing be made? See F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 6-9.
149
Sightings in Antarctica are often questionable because of severe weather conditions. Clouds and icebergs have given rise to territorial claims. F. M. AUBURN, THE
Ross DEPENDENCY 17 (1982).
150
Does a landing on the coast give rise to a claim to the entire continent? Does a
landing on an island give rise to a claim over the mainland?
The various difficulties inherent in the discovery principle are illustrated by the
commentator who cited the Maori legend that Antarctica was discovered by the hero Uite-Rangiora in the distant past. The impossibility of evaluating the legitimacy of this
claim exemplifies the weaknesses of the discovery principle. Id.
144

145

F. AUBURN, supra note
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b. Occupation
Historically, an individual could obtain tide to previously unclaimed territory by occupying it.'1' The more stringent doctrine of
effective occupation, developed during the nineteenth century, requires state-sanctioned, permanent occupation and settlement in order to perfect tide. 15 2 Under the effective occupation doctrine,
possession must be actual, continuous, and useful.' 5 3 An effective
154
occupation may follow the establishment of an "inchoate tide"'
through initial acts of possession or discovery. Settlement or a consistent pattern of activity must follow such acts in order to maintain
a territorial claim. 15 5 Inchoate title allows the claimant to relate its
claim back to the initial act of possession, thereby granting it prior156
ity over subsequent competing claims.
The exact quantum of activity required to establish an effective
occupation is unclear.' 57 Given the size of Antarctica, however, the
largely scientific activities of the Treaty parties are insufficient to
constitute effective occupation or to perfect inchoate tide. 158 The
presence of the Treaty parties in Antartica consists mainly of iso151
Before the rise in European exploration and colonialization in the middle of the
15th century, the only unclaimed lands were newly formed islands. The individual who
first occupied these islands acquired tide. Grieg, supra note 114, at 140.
152 See F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 11; W. HALL, supra note 143, at 125-31; R.JENNINGS,

153
154

IE
155

supra note 133, at 20-23.
F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 11.
W. HALL, supra note 143, at 127. As Hall explained:
An inchoate tide acts as a temporary bar to occupation by another state,
but it must either be converted into a definitive tide within reasonable
time by planting settlements or military posts, or it must at least be kept
alive by repeated local acts showing an intention of continual claim.

Id at 126-27.

In order for tide to be perfected, effective occupation must follow the initial acts
of possession within a reasonable period. What constitutes a "reasonable period," however, is an unresolved issue. Commentators have variously suggested 20, 25, 30, or 40
years as the limit. F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 9.
157 The specific requirements which determine what constitutes effective occupation
have not been agreed upon. One standard often cited is contained in the General Act of
the Berlin Congo Conference of 1885, reprintedin 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 24 (Supp. 1909).
Chapter VI of the Act lists "THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO BE FULFILLED IN
ORDER THAT NEW OCCUPATIONS UPON THE COASTS OF THE AFRICAN
CONTINENT MAY BE CONSIDERED AS EFFECTIVE." Id. Article 35 provides that
states must "assure, in the territories occupied by them, upon the coasts of the African
Continent, the existence of an authority sufficient to cause acquired rights to be
respected and, the case occurring, the liberty of commerce and of transit in the conditions upon which it may be stipulated." Id.; see F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 11-12.
158
Benedetto Conforti, TerritorialClaims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an
Old Problem, 19 CORNELL ITrr'L L.J. 249, 255-56 (1986); see Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth)
(Apr. 4, 1928) UNRIAA (Vol. II) 829, reprinted in R. JENNINGS, supra note 133, at 88
(requiring "continuous and peaceful display of state functions" to establish sovereignty); W. HALL, supra note 143, at 126 (title over territory requires "effective control,
and would last only while it continued").
156
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lated scientific stations that occupy only small areas; this presence
does not reach the level of permanent settlement and administration required under the theory of effective occupation.159
Commentators have argued that inhospitable environments call
for a reduced standard in applying the doctrine of effective occupation.16 0 In support of such a view, some commentators have cited
the Eastern Greenland case, 16 1 which involved a dispute over the competing claims of Denmark and Norway to the eastern coast of Greenland. Denmark had established permanent settlements on the
southern and western coasts, but proclaimed its intention to exercise sovereignty over the entire island, including the eastern coast
where it had no significant presence. Norwegian fishermen had
maintained bases on the eastern coast for centuries, but Norway had
not formally asserted a claim until this litigation arose. The Perma16 2
nent Court of International Justice held in favor of Denmark.
The commentators suggest that the court based its decision
upon a finding that, given the harsh conditions prevailing in that
region, Denmark's minimal presence in eastern Greenland was sufficient to establish an effective occupation. 63 However, the outcome
in Eastern Greenland was not determined by effective occupation. Instead, the decision rested upon the fact that Denmark's claim went
essentially unchallenged for centuries, 164 and that Norway made
statements which could be interpreted as recognizing the validity of
Denmark's claim. 165 In other words, the decision in Eastern Green159
It must also be noted that pursuant to Article IV of the Treaty, acts occurring
while the Treaty is in force may not constitute a basis of claim to territorial sovereignty.
See Note, Allocation of Mineral Resources in Antarctica: Problems and a Possible Solution, 10
HASINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 525, 533 (1987) (authored by Helena M. Tetzeli); supra
notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
160
See, e.g., F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 13-14; E.W. Johnson, Quick, Before it Melts:
Toward a Resolution ofJurisdictionalMorass in Antarctica, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 182 (1976).
Claimant states themselves, such as Australia, have advanced this view. See Grieg, supra
note 114, at 164.
161
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.Ij. (ser. A/B) No.
53, at 22 (Apr. 5).
162
Id.
163
See Grieg, supra note 114, at 164-71. Grieg suggests that in Eastern Greenland,
"the Court discarded any notion of possession of, in the sense of a physical presence in,
the disputed territory." Id. at 163. Grieg nevertheless concludes that the reasoning of
Eastern Greenland is inapposite to the situation in Antarctica. Eastern Greenland was essentially a resolution of two competing claims because there was an "absence of external
interest" in eastern Greenland. Id. at 168. In contrast, "Antarctica has been a matter of
concern to states other than the claimants." Claims there have to be valid in their own
right, as against all interested states. ld ;see A.C. Castles, The International Status of the
Australian Antarctic Territory, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 341, 350-51, 353-56
(D.P. O'Connell ed. 1965); Humphery Waldock, DisputedSovereignty in the FalklandIslands
Dependencies, 25 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 311, 324-25 (1948).
164 Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. at 28.
165
Id at 50-53.
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land did not rest upon the validity of Denmark's means of acquisition, but rather upon Norway's implicit recognition of Denmark's
claim. Eastern Greenland does not, therefore, provide support for
claimant states who assert that isolated scientific activities are suffident to constitute an effective occupation under a reduced standard
applicable to inhospitable regions.
c.

16 6

Propinquity

The theory of propinquity provides that when a state acquires
sovereignty over part of a geographical unit, it acquires sovereignty
over the entire unit. 16 7 As applied to Antarctica, sovereignty over a
section of the Antarctic coast translates into a claim to sovereignty
over the adjacent inland region. Thus claimant states may contend
that the establishment of a small research station supports a claim to
the entire geographical unit within which the station is situated.
This theory has the advantage of not requiring effective occupation
of an entire area. Propinquity is, however, ambiguous and uncertain
in its application. 168 Given the inherent difficulty of determining
what constitutes a distinct geographical unit in Antarctica, the territorial extent of such a claim would be unclear. 169 Furthermore,
although scholars developed the theory of propinquity to support
European colonial claims during the nineteenth century, the theory
was explicitly rejected at the Berlin Congo Conference of 1885 by
70
those for whose benefit it was developed.'
d.

Sector Theory

Sector theory, developed with respect to the Arctic polar region, provides that states whose territory extends above the Arctic
Circle' 7 ' acquire sovereignty over the triangular sector with a baseline which extends between the extreme eastern and western limits
166

Also referred to as "contiguity" and "continuity," and "hinterland" theory. See

Quincy Wright, TerritorialPropinquity, 12 AM.J. INT'L L. 519, 520, 522 (1918).
167 Conforti, supra note 158, at 254. The question of what constitutes a "unit" remains. Conforti suggests, for example, that sovereignty over an island would give rise to
sovereignty over the archipelago of which it is a part. Similarly, sovereignty over a sector of coastline would extend to the hinterland up to a natural geographical border. Id.
168 Id at 255. Propinquity also requires that the claimant hold valid title to the
coastal area. However, it is herein contended that in Antarctica, no valid title to the
coastal area exists.
169 Even if such a unit could be defined, it would not correspond to the boundaries
of the actual claims, which uniformly follow the meridians. Id
170 The Berlin Conference of 1885 was convened to determine the rights of European states asserting claims in the Congo. The Conference dealt with previously occupied territories, and also established the conditions for future occupation. See F.

AUBURN, supra note 15, at 11. The Final Act explicitly rejected propinquity and reaf-

firmed the principle of effective occupation. Conforti, supra note 158, at 254.
171
Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union, Denmark, and Norway.
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of that state's northern coastline, and with the apex at the north
pole. 172 States asserting claims in Antarctica, with the exception of
Norway, have relied to some extent upon the sector theory. 17 3 The
method of delineating claims under this theory superficially accords
with the actual territorial claims in Antarctica, which happen to be
triangular. 74 By its own definition, however, the sector theory
should not apply to Antarctica since no state's territory extends below the Antarctic Circle.1 75 In fact, no state's territory extends below sixty degrees south latitude, the baseline of the seven extant
176
claims.
Sector theory has never gained wide recognition in the international community.1 7 7 The United States, Denmark, and Norway,
which are all Treaty parties, and one of which (Norway) is a claimant
state, have explicitly rejected the sector theory.' 78 Objections have
been based in part upon the conflict with the requirement of effective occupation, 179 the arbitrary placement of baselines, i8 0 and the
18
conflict with freedom of the high seas. '
e.

Uti Posseditis

The uti posseditis principle suggests that the Antarctic claims of
Chile and Argentina are legitimate as a matter of historic right. In
the Bull Inter Caetera Divinae of 1493, Pope Alexander VII divided
the unclaimed regions of the world between Spain and Portugal.
Antarctica falls within the half of the world ostensibly granted to
Spain.' 8 2 When Argentina and Chile seceded from Spain in 1810,
172
For a thorough discussion of the origins and evolution of the sector theory and
its application in Antarctica, see F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 23-31. Auburn concludes
that "[e]xtension of the sector theory to Antarctica contradicts accepted means of acquisition of territory in international law." Id. at 25. But seeJ.S. Reeves, Antarctic Sectors, 33
AM.J. INT'L L. 519, 521 (1939).
173
F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 31.
174
The eastern and western boundaries of each claim follow the geographical
meridians.
175
The Antarctic Circle is the appropriate demarcation line since it directly corresponds to the Arctic Circle. Sector theory in Antarctica derives directly from Arctic sector theory; therefore, the elements should correspond.
Without a northern limit, a multitude of nations would have legitimate territorial
claims in Antarctica, including Uruguay, Brazil, Guatemala, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, Panama, and Peru in the Americas alone. F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 24.
176
"The sector principle is founded on geography, but the triangle in Antarctica has
no geographic base." Conforti, supra note 158, at 254.
177 F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 31.
178
Conforti, supra note 158, at 253-54.
179
Subush C. Jain, Antarctica: Geopolitics and InternationalLaw, 17 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L
AFF. 249, 266 (1974); see supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text.
180 F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 24; see supra note 175.
181
F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 27-28.
182
Antarctica is held to have been included in the grant, despite the fact that Antarctica had not been discovered at the time of the allocation. P. QUIGG, supra note 15, at 16.
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they retained the Spanish claims. l8 3 While the grant was intended
to be binding upon third parties, only Spain and Portugal, the two
states who had requested papal intervention, recognized the pope's
authority to make such a disposition.' 8 4 This arcane theory has
never gained wide acceptance. Given the lack of international consent to the papal disposition, it is not a convincing basis for jurisdiction over Antarctic mineral resources.
2.

Objective Treaty Regime

The consultative parties may also assert a right to exercise jurisdiction over Antarctica on their own behalf without relying upon the
authority of the claimant states as territorial sovereigns. The consultative parties may be entitled to exercise jurisdiction, binding
upon third parties, if the Antarctic Treaty could be deemed an "objective" treaty.
An objective treaty is an international agreement which is binding on third parties without their consent.18 5 The essence of an objective treaty regime was described in Article 63 of the International
Law Commission's 1964 draft of the Vienna Treaty on Treaties. 18 6
The proposed Article stated that a treaty creates an objective regime
when it is clear
from its terms and from the circumstances of its conclusion that
the intention of the parties is to create in the general interest general obligations and rights relating to a particular region ... ;
provided that the parties include among their number any State
having territorial competence with reference to the subject-matter
that any such State has consented to the provision
of the treaty, or
87
in question.'
Given a loose reading of "territorial competence," the Antarctic
183

For a more thorough discussion of uti posseditis, or historic right, see PHILIP W.

QUIGG, A POLE APART 113-14 (1983).
184
Grieg, supra note 114, at 142.
185
Birnie, supra note 118, at 243-49;

see also Bruno Simma, The Antarctic Treaty as a
Treaty Providingfor an "Objective Regime, " 19 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 189 (1986).
It is difficult to find an actual example of an objective treaty in international law.
Supporters of the objective treaty doctrine often point to Sweden's reliance upon a convention between Britain, France, and Germany concerning the demilitarization of the
Aland Islands as evidence of an objective treaty. Sweden was not a party to the agreement, but it relied upon the agreement as creating rights and obligations binding upon
third parties with respect to the territory at issue. See Birnie, supra note 118, at 241.
186
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedforsignatureMay 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 289 (entered into forceJan. 27, 1980). The Vienna Convention
was essentially a codification of customary international law with respect to the interpretation, utilization, and effect of international agreements. See INTERNATONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 993-94.
187
Third Report on the Law of Treaties, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/167 (1964).
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Treaty satisfies the above criteria.1 8 8 The question remains whether
the objective treaty doctrine is a valid legal concept.
In this respect, it is significant that the above-cited proposal was
not adopted in the final version of the Vienna Convention. 18 9 The
disagreement over the draft of Article 63 reflects the general lack of
consensus among international legal commentators about the validity of the objective treaty doctrine.190 The strongest argument
against the doctrine is that it contradicts the legal principle of pacta
tertiis, 19 1 which provides that an agreement is binding only with the
consent of the contracting parties. 19 2 One commentator has
pointed out that an objective treaty "would presuppose an inherent
capacity of the parties to the treaty to oblige third States and would
amount to a kind of legislative power which is unknown in the present state of international law."' 193 Furthermore, the objective treaty
doctrine runs directly counter to both the fundamental principles of
state sovereignty and independence,1 94 and the requirement of consensus to establish legitimacy in international law. 195
The lack of consensus concerning the validity of the objective
treaty doctrine makes the doctrine inadequate as the sole basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the Convention. Arguably, however, the Treaty parties' intent to create an objective regime has gained recognition as customary international law through
188 This draft article was, in fact, expressly intended to apply to the Antarctic Treaty.
Simma, supra note 185, at 193-94.
189
Birnie, supra note 118, at 244. It was, in fact, precluded by the final version of
the Vienna Convention. Article 34 states that "[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 186, art. 34.
190 The greater weight of authority holds that the concept of an objective treaty is
inconsistent with international law. See remarks of Eckart Klein, Panel Discussion, in
ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE II, supra note 4, at 338-42 ("there are no a prioriobjective treatybased international regimes valid erga omnes... ."Id. at 338); see also F. AUBURN, supra note
15, at 117 ("the concept of an objective regime is not supported by international law");
Christopher Pinto, The InternationalCommunity and Antarctica, 33 U. MxAmi L. REv. 475,
482 (1978). But see INGRID DETrER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1967); Birnie, supra
note 118, at 255-58; Simma, supra note 185, at 192-208.
191
Pacta tertis nec nocent nec prosunt.
192
Birnie, supra note 118, at 239.
193
Klein, supra note 190, at 338-39.
194
See Luzius Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY
425 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds. 1983) [hereinafter LEGAL PHiLOSO-

PHY]. Sovereignty is a fundamental attribute of statehood. The sovereignty of a state

relative to other states (external sovereignty) "signifies independence, that is, the power
of a state to determine its tasks, means and structures independently from any foreign
state or organization." Id. at 436-37; see also Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.) (Apr. 4,
1928) UNRIAA 829, reprinted in R. JENNINGS, supra note 133, at 88, 91 ("Sovereignty in
the relation between states signifies independence.").
195

See supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
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the acquiescence of the international community. If that is the case,
then the Treaty parties have the authority to exercise jurisdiction
over Antarctica regardless of the initial validity of the Treaty as an
objective treaty. The following section addresses this argument by
discussing the nature and effect of customary international law.
3.

Customary InternationalLaw

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
lists as one of the four sources of international law "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." 1 9 6 A
customary rule of law has two components: the general practice of
states, and the recognition by states that this general practice has
become law (opiniojuris).19 7 The general practice element requires a
demonstrable pattern of unambiguous and consistent state practice. 198 There is disagreement, however, over the amount of time
which must elapse before a general practice or asserted principle
becomes binding as customary law. 19 9 The recognition of the prac20 0
tice must be widespread, but need not be universal.
A multilateral agreement such as the Treaty or the Convention
196 Statute of the International Court ofJustice (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945),
1983 U.N.Y.B. 1334, art. 38, para. 1(b). The English text of the Statute is authentic, but
the original was drafted in French. Bin Cheng suggests that a more accurate translation
of article 38(b) reads: "International custom, as evidenced by a general practice accepted as law." Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State PracticeIn a Divided World,
in LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 194, at 513, 514.
For a general introduction to the concept of customary international law, see D.W.
GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-41 (1970).

197 G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 10, at 26. But see Robert Y. Jennings, The Identification of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHING AND PRAC-

3 (Bin Cheng ed. 1982) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW] (suggesting that the
orthodox two-part test is "outworn and inadequate." Id. at 4). Some commentators
contend that only the first element, state practice, is required. See Brian Flemming, Customary InternationalLaw and the Law of the Sea: A New Dynamic, in LAw OF THE SEA: STATE
PRACTICE IN ZONES OF SPECIAL JuRISDICTION 489, 491 (S.A. Clingan ed. 1982); Lazare
Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creationof InternationalLaw, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
129-30 (1937). Others, perhaps fewer in number, claim that only the second element,
opiniojuris,is necessary. See Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant"
International Customary Law?, 5 INDIANJ. INT'L L. 23, 36 (1965).
198 R.P. Anand, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United States, 24 INDIANJ.
INT'L L. 153, 185 (1984).
199
1d ("[I]t could range from a century to a month, or even according to some
writers, customary international law can be created 'instantly.' ").
200 Bin Cheng, On the Nature and Sources of InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 197, at 203, 225-29; see also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 191 (1958) ("If universal acceptance
alone is the hall-mark of the existence of a rule of international law, how many rules of
international law can there be said to be in effective existence?" Id. The answer is not
very many.). The converse of acceptance is opposition. It may be that if even a small
number of states or a single state that is directly affected protests strongly, then no
customary rule could emerge. Anand, supra note 198, at 185-86.
TICE
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may provide the source for rules of customary international law. On
occasion, standards of conduct which were binding initially only by
virtue of their explicit stipulation in an international agreement became enforceable rules of customary law through widespread acceptance among the international community. Products of such an
evolution include the principle of freedom of the seas, and the minimum standards of protection owed to foreigners. 20 Furthermore,
an international agreement may create customary law that binds not
only the parties to the agreement, but also third parties. 20 2 Article
38 of the Vienna Treaty on Treaties supports this view, providing
that the principle of pacta tertiis20 3 does not "preclude[] a rule set
forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a cus20 4
tomary rule of international law, recognized as such."
a.

The Treaty as Customary InternationalLaw

The Antarctic Treaty exemplifies an international agreement
that may give rise to customary international law. 20 5 Although the
Treaty itself may fulfill the requirement of general practice, the
world community must recognize the Treaty as law in order for its
rules to crystallize into customary law.2 0 6 Therefore, one must examine the actions and statements of both member and nonmember
states during the thirty years since the creation of the Treaty to determine whether there has been general acquiescence in, and recognition of, the Treaty parties' right to exercise jurisdiction over
Antarctica.
Initially, widespread, if passive, acquiescence to the operation
of the Treaty existed. 20 7 During its early years, however, the objecSee G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 10, at 26-27.
Some commentators assert that a treaty may give rise to customary rules of law
immediately, despite the absence of a long-established general practice among states.
ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (1971).
Other commentators view the treaty merely as evidence of state practice, which is one
element of the traditional two-part test. See R. R. Baxter, MultilateralTreaties as Evidence of
Customary InternationalLaw, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 277 (1965-66). But see Cheng, supra
note 196, at 526-30 (contending that "[t]reaties [florm [p]art of the [i]nterational
[l]egal [s]ystem, but [a]re [n]ot a [s]ource of [g]eneral [i]nternational (l]aw." Id at 526).
202
See Anand, supra note 198, at 188 ("[A] treaty which breaks entirely new ground
may stimulate the crystalization of customary rules binding even on non-parties to the
treaty.").
203
See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
204
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 186, art. 38.
201

205
206

See W. BUSH, supra note 51, at 102-03.

See Anand, supra note 188, at 190 ("inhere is no doubt that strong dissent to a
treaty by a small number of states, or even a single powerful and influential state, whose
interests are directly affected ... would distract from the authority of the treaty and
adversely affect the emergence of customary international law on the subject.").
207
See Riidiger Wolfrum, The Use of Antarctic Non-Living Resources: The Searchfor a
Trustee, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 162. Wolfrum states that "the world
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tives of the Treaty were fairly limited as they were concerned primarily with scientific research and the prohibition of nonpeaceful
activities. 208 Furthermore, the Treaty did not explicitly assert territorial jurisdiction over Antartica. 20 9 In fact, there was no need to
assert jurisdiction under the original Treaty, as the only nations having a substantial interest in Antarctica were Treaty parties who were
subject to the terms of the Treaty.
As the Antarctic Treaty System developed, its inherently noncontroversial nature changed. 210 The Treaty parties, particularly
those with consultative status, relied increasingly upon their privileged status to justify a broader authority over activities in and
around Antarctica. This evolution is manifested by the Convention,
under which the Treaty parties have, in effect, claimed jurisdiction
over Antarctica's mineral resources. 2 1 1 In order to legitimize their
authority to undertake such activities, the consultative parties must
rely upon the questionable proposition that the international community's initial acquiescence in the Treaty's limited authority may
be automatically expanded to accommodate additional activities.
However, even assuming the validity of this proposition, the Convention has not attained the status of customary international law.
b.

The Convention as Customary InternationalLaw

Those who view the Antarctic Treaty System as customary international law imply that the authority to exercise jurisdiction over
mineral resources derives from the international community's acquiescence in the earlier activities of the Treaty parties. 2 12 This view is
implicit in the Convention itself. The preamble to the Convention
asserts that "the Antarctic Treaty system has proved effective in promoting international harmony in furtherance of the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations."2 13 The Convention also refers to the "special responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Parties to ensure that all activities in Antarctica are
community has over twenty years [as of 1983] accepted the activities of the Consultative
Parties in Antarctica and has thus acquiesced to the Consultative Parties in Antarctica,
the general validity of the Antarctic Treaty as such and the special functions exercised by
the Consultative Parties." Id4
208 See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
210 See infra text accompanying notes 215-16.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
212 See, e.g., F. Orrego Vicuna, The Antarctic Treaty System: A Viable Alternativefor the
Regulation of Resource-OrientedActivities,in THE ATARcrIc TREATY REGIME, supra note 4, at
66 (The Treaty System "has been an effective guarantor of peace and stability in the
region, thereby ensuring the fundamental basis of the development of successive regimes applicable to the activities in the region, which include.., the.., question of
minerals.").
213 Convention, supra note 1, at preamble.
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consistent with the purposes and principles of the Antarctic
Treaty." 2 14 These statements represent an attempt to portray the
Convention as a continuation of the Treaty, thus establishing the
international community's alleged acquiescence in the terms of the
Treaty as the source of the Convention's authority.
The Convention, however, represents a significant departure
from the Treaty in terms of both subject matter and the exercise of
jurisdiction. 2 15 The fact that the rest of the world did not object to
the regulation of scientific activities does not grant the consultative
parties the right to exercise ownership over mineral resources. The
Convention cannot derive its claim to legal status directly from the
Treaty. Instead, the Convention must establish its own validity
through independent recognition by the international community in
2 16
order to attain the status of customary international law.
The necessary recognition, however, has not occurred. As the
Treaty System has focused on mineral resource exploitation, and
the international community has turned its attention to Antarctica,
passive acquiescence in the status quo has vanished. Growing criticism of the Treaty System has accompanied the evolution of the
Convention, demonstrating the lack of widespread support for the
consultative parties' attempt to extend the current regime to govern
mineral resources. 2 17 As the Malaysian Prime Minister, Mohammad
Mahathir, declared to the United Nations General Assembly in
1982, "[the Antarctic] Treaty... [is] an agreement between a select
group of countries and does not reflect the true feelings of members
2 18
of the United Nations."
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
See Birnie, supra note 118, at 257. Birnie emphasizes the need for renewed acquiescence corresponding to each incremental expansion of the consultative parties'
claimed authority. Birnie suggests that the consultative parties "feel insecure" due to
the international community's increasing reluctance to participate in agreements arising
under the Treaty System. The cause of this reluctance is their unwillingness to "recognize the privileged role" of the consultative parties. Id.
217 See Christopher Pinto, Comment, in CHALLENGE I, supra note 4, at 164. Responding to the assertion that the international community has acquiesced to the Treaty System, Pinto declares that "the world community has done nothing of the kind. Neither
the facts nor the law would support such a theory." Id. at 165. See also Hayashi, supra
note 11. Hayashi points to the dissatisfaction with the Treaty System expressed during
the 38th and 39th sessions of the United Nations General Assembly.
218
Remarks of Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir, U.N. Doc. A/37/PV 10, at 17
(1982). Similar pronouncements were made at the Seventh Conference of the NonAligned Movement in 1983. U.N. Doc. A/38/132, at 98 (1983). The Organization of
African Unity in 1985 adopted a resolution rejecting the current regime, and declaring
"Antarctica to be the common heritage of mankind." U.N. Doc. A/40/666, at 73 (1985).
The purported "openness" of membership in the Treaty System may also be used
to support the claim that the Treaty System has gained recognition as customary law. In
this respect, it may be suggested that unwillingness to participate in the Treaty organiza214
215
216
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ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY SYSTEM

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the Antarctic Treaty System lacks the legal authority required to exercise jurisdiction over
third parties. Nor is there a valid legal basis for what amounts to a
claim to "ownership" of Antarctic mineral resources. 2 19 In international law, however, legal arguments are rarely absolutely determinative. Given the lack of definitive rules and the continuously
shifting consensus basis of international law, international arrangements such as the Treaty System must be evaluated in terms of their
pragmatic effect in light of political and economic, as well as legal
concerns.
Some advocates of the Treaty System have emphasized the alleged benefits of the current Antarctic regime in arguing for its retention. Although the various claims of these Treaty advocates are
not easily categorized, they generally relate to the openness of the
Antarctic Treaty System, the successful suppression of territorial
claims, or the overall practical effectiveness of the Antarctic Treaty
System. Upon examination, however, none of these arguments is
convincing.
A. The Antarctic Treaty System Is a "Closed Shop"
Several commentators have argued that the "openness" of
membership in the Treaty System reflects a concern with the interests of the international community. 220 This openness is supposedly demonstrated by the "well known fact that participation is open
tion reflects a lack of interest in the subject, which in turn may suggest at least passive
acquiescence in the status quo. If the Treaty did in fact provide for open membership,
then arguably this could be the case. The two-tiered membership structure, and the
substantial requirements for obtaining consultative status, however, are significant considerations which counsel against membership, reasons which suggest more than a mere
lack of interest. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text. Mere lack of participation
in the Treaty System does not, then, evidence acquiescence in the status quo, or recognition of the Treaty System as customary international law.
219 By exercising exclusive control over the allocation of mineral resources, the consultative parties' undertaking assumes the fundamental characteristic of property ownership. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434
(1982) (Marshall, J.) ("Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the
rights 'to possess, use and dispose of it.' ") (quoting United States v. General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
220 See Australia, View of States, U.N. Doc. A/39/583 (Part II) Oct. 29, 1984, at 85
(The Treaty "is open to accession by any Member State of the United Nations, or any
country which may be invited to accede with the consent of the Consultative Parties-it
is thus as universal as the interest of States in Antarctica."); Sollie, supra note 45, at 23
("the Antarctic Treaty System is in fact an open system"); Trolle-Anderson, supra note
71, at 63-64; Vicuna, supra note 212, at 65, 68-70 ("Neither the Antarctic Treaty nor any
of the regimes associated with it have established a closed system of participation." Id.
at 69); Wolfrum, supra note 207, at 162 ( "The co-administration [of Antarctica] rests
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to all the members of the United Nations." 221 That accession is
open to all United Nations member states2 22 is misleading, however,
since access to meaningful participation is far more limited. In fact,
since the consultative parties dominate the policymaking institutions
of both the Treaty and the Convention, the international community
does not have an opportunity to advance its interests within the
Treaty System.
Within the two-tiered membership structure of the Antarctic
Treaty, decisionmaking authority is exercised exclusively by the consultative parties. 2 23 Although the Treaty provides that any contracting party may apply for consultative status if it conducts
substantial scientific research in Antarctica, 224 this requirement represents a major obstacle for less-developed countries that have few
resources to devote to this type of project. Critics have charged that
less-developed countries are effectively excluded from consultative
status, and consequently are excluded from meaningful participa225
tion under the current regime.
The dosed shop character of the Treaty is perpetuated by the
Convention, which concentrates decisionmaking authority in the
Resources Commission. 2 26 To join the Resources Commission, a
party to the Convention must satisfy two requirements. First, the
applicant must be "actively engaged in substantial scientific, technical and environmental research. ' 227 This requirement, again,
presents a significant economic barrier for less developed states. 228
with the Consultative Parties and is in no way restricted to a small group, but open to all
those States who have shown a substantial interest in Antarctic matters.").
221
Vicuna, supra note 212, at 69.
222
Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII, para. 1.
223
See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
224
Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX, para. 2.
225
One commentator has stated that consultative status is a "role to be purchased
by what amounts to a demonstration of technical competence and financial capacity beyond the reach of the poorer countries." Pinto, supra note 217, at 168.
The interpretation of this provision is left to the consultative parties themselves.
Furthermore, an application for consultative status must be unanimously approved by
the current consultative parties. See supra note 74.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 94-99.
227
Convention, supra note 1, art. 18, para. 2(b).
228
It may seem that the threshold requirement of scientific and technical research
has greater justification as a condition for membership on the Resources Commission
than as a condition for attaining consultative status under the Treaty. See supra note 74
and accompanying text. A state unable to support extensive research in Antarctica presumably would not be in a position to undertake mineral resource exploitation either.
Further analysis suggests, however, that interests other than resource exploitation may
be implicated in a mineral resource regime. Excluded states may, for example, have a
strong interest in preventing any mineral resource activities from taking place for environmental reasons, or an interest in supporting the world market for minerals. Furthermore, less developed states may be concerned that rapid exploitation will result in
depletion of Antarctica's mineral wealth before they gain the technical sophistication
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Second, the Resources Commission must approve the membership. 229 The membership decisions of the Resources Commission
are not reviewable. Given that the consultative parties will make up
the initial Resources Commission, they could conceivably use this
arrangement to perpetuate their dominance indefinitely.
B.

Suppression of Territorial Claims

Treaty proponents have called Article IV an "ingenious
formula" that has made peaceful cooperation possible under the
Treaty System. 2 30 By emphasizing the magnitude of this accomplishment, these commentators implicitly recognize the determination with which claimant states adhere to their respective claims.
However, Article IV does not affect the validity of territorial claims;
it merely places a moratorium on their assertion vis-a'-vis other
claimants. 23- The seven territorial claims which arose prior to the
Treaty retain their original force, 232 and should the Treaty System
which will allow them to participate. Thus, for a variety of reasons, states lacking the
ability to satisfy the threshold requirement may have vital interests which will be left
unprotected under the Convention.
229 Convention, supra note 1, art. 18, para. 4.
The choice of language in this membership provision is significant. A party wishing
to obtain representation on the Commission must submit a "notification and accompanying information," in effect an application. Id. art. 18, para. 3. Upon submission, the
Commission will take this notification under consideration. A nonconsultative party
"submitting a notification shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirements for Commission membership if no member of the Commission objects at the meeting at which
such notification is considered." Id. art. 18, para. 4. By creating this presumption of
validity, the drafters have given the decision an objective cast. Had the burden of satisfying the Commission been placed squarely upon the applicant, the procedure would
seem more arbitrary, and membership more exclusive. A similar statutory device was
employed in the Treaty, with respect to the requirements for attaining consultative status. For a discussion of membership criteria under the Treaty, see F. AUBURN, supra note
15, at 147-50.
230
"Through the effectiveness of this article, Antarctica has remained the ione of
peace which the signatories of the Treaty had hoped for." Trolle-Anderson, supra note
71, at 60; see also Australia, View of States, supra note 220, at 85 (Article IV has "averted
international strife and conflict over Antarctica, inter alia, by putting aside the question
of claims to sovereignty in Antarctica, thereby removing the potential for dispute."); R.
Tucker Scully, Institutionalisationof theAntarctic Treaty Regime, in ANTARCarc CHALLENGE II,
supra note 4, at 284 (Scully commends the "elaboration of imaginative juridical accommodation which is reflected in Article IV"); Gillian D. Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime:
A Workable Compromise ora "Purgatoyof Ambiguity?", 17 CASE W. REs.J. INr'L L. 195, 201
(1985).
231
Auburn states that Article IV "was not an agreement on territorial status, but
rather a decision not to press claims." F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 118; see W. BUSH,
supra note 51, at 57-58.
232
The language of the Treaty clearly supports this view, Article IV states that
"[n]othing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as ...a renunciation by
any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica." Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. 1.
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lapse, the territorial claims would reemerge intact. 2 3 Article IV
thus does not represent a solution to the problem of conflicting
claims, rather, it is a tenuous compromise without which the current
23 4
regime could not exist.
The moratorium on claims established by Article IV has been
effective for the limited purposes of the Treaty. 23 5 Mineral resource
activities as contemplated by the Convention, however, are not reconcilable with the status of the claimant and nonclaimant parties
under Article IV. As discussed previously, Article IV of the Treaty
System did not resolve the underlying differences between the positions of the claimant and nonclaimant parties. The seven claimant
states assert that their territorial claims are valid; the nonclaimant
states refuse to recognize any such claims. Article IV simply institutionalized these fundamental differences. Given the ownership
rights which territorial sovereignty implies, 23 6 extraction of mineral
resources without authorization by a sovereign (claimant) state constitutes an infringement of sovereignty. Faced with the ambiguity of
Article IV, and at the same time desiring to authorize mineral resource activities, the drafters of the Convention chose to recognize
the validity of territorial claims by conceding privileged status to
claimant states through mandatory representation on the Regulatory Committees. 2 37 While the conflict-producing potential of this
arrangement will not be revealed until the Convention is implemented, Treaty advocates cannot assert that the Convention has resolved the issue of individual claims.
C.

Limited Success of the Antarctic Treaty System

Commentators who support the current legal regime for Antarctica frequently justify the regime by emphasizing the successful
attainment of its objectives. 23 8 The consultative parties themselves
233
Bruno Simma suggests that the consultative parties viewed Article IV as an interim provision. The consultative parties explicitly "wanted to retain the option of asserting their interests 'by all means' should the Treaty operation and cooperation break
up." Simma, supra note 185, at 204.
234
Trolle-Anderson, supra note 71, at 59-60.
235
None of the activities contemplated under the Treaty would constitute a significant infringement of the claimant state's territorial sovereignty. See supra notes 119-20
and accompanying text. Article VIII deals with the allocation of personal jurisdiction,
but it is expressly limited to "acts and omissions" of observers and scientific personnel
which occur in the course of their Treaty functions. Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII, para.
1.
236
See supra note 132.
237
See supra text accompanying notes 100-08.
238
For example, Wolfrum claims that "[t]he intense cooperation in the fields of scientific research, demilitarization, protection of the environment, meteorology and communication under the auspices of the Antarctic system is indicative not only of the
existence of a juridical regime but of its ability and proficiency." Wolfrum, supra note
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have often emphasized the Treaty System's effectiveness. Recommendation IX-1 on Antarctic mineral resources, approved by the
consultative parties, proclaimed that "the framework established by
the Antarctic Treaty has proved effective in promoting international
harmony... in ensuring the protection of the Antarctic environment, and in promoting freedom of scientific research in Antarctica
..... 2s9 In practice, however, the Antarctic Treaty system has not
been as successful as its proponents claim. An examination of the
Treaty System's operation reveals that these claims of success are
overstated. This is particularly true in the areas of environmental
protection and international cooperation, with respect to both the
degree and scope of claimed success.
1. Environmental Protection
The consultative parties' frequent pronouncements on the subject of environmental protection have not translated into positive
action. The consultative parties have, for example, declared that it
is "the special responsibilit[y] of the Consultative Parties to ensure
that any activities in Antarctica ... should not become the cause of
... danger to the unique Antarctic environment." 240 Despite such
expressions of concern, there has been little or no effective enforce241
ment of environmental protection measures.
A recent example of this lack of protection involved the con24 2
struction of an airstrip at Pointe Geologie in the French sector.
The airstrip was to be built at a location specifically identified as a
207, at 162; see also Bergin, supra note 32, at 38 ("For nearly three decades, the Treaty
has been a means by which many beneficial ends have been achieved, including protection of an intricate Antarctic ecosystem and mitigation of volatile international disagreement over sovereignty claims."); Trolle-Anderson, supra note 71, at 57 ("Antarctica of
today is a continent of peace and cooperation.").
Furthermore, it is often suggested that the past accomplishments of the Treaty System provide a sound basis for its future expansion. See Note, supra note 159, at 554
("The Antarctic Treaty and its conventions have been successful in achieving their
objectives, and, thus, the world community should continue to utilize them.").
239 Recommendation IX-1: Antarctic Mineral Resources, reprinted in W. BusH, supra note
51, at 343, 344.
240
d at 344. In developing a mineral resources regime, the consultative parties
formally endorsed the principle that "protection of the unique Antarctic environment
and of its dependent ecosystems should be a basic consideration." Id. at 345. The Convention itself echoes these concerns. The Convention provides that "the protection of
the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems must be a basic
consideration in decisions taken on possible Antarctic mineral resource activities." Convention, supra note 1, at preamble.
241 James N. Barnes, Legal Aspects of Environmental Protection in Antarctica, in THE
ANTARCTIc LEGAL REGIME, supra note 3, at 241.
242
For a more thorough account of this episode, see Christopher C. Joyner, Protection of the Antarctic Environment: Rethinking the Problems and Prospects, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
259, 268-70 (1986).
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priority site for the,study of Antarctic wildlife. Construction was undertaken without securing the environmental impact reports and
construction permits as required under French law. The resulting
disruption to the habitat of several rare Antarctic bird species violated not only French law, but also the Agreed Measures for the
Conservation of Flora and Fauna, 245 and the Treaty itself.244 Despite the objections of several scientific and environmental organizations, 24 5 none of the consultative parties publicly took notice of the
situation. The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, an environmental organization, concluded that the "handling of this case
raises a question of credibility for the Antarctic Treaty System. If
member governments fail to take any collective action-even to investigate allegations of a breach-the public can have little confidence in the commitments of governments pursuant to the Antarctic
24 6
Treaty and related instruments."
In addition to their failure to take positive action, the consultative parties have frequently frustrated independent international efforts to protect the Antarctic environment. 24 7 For example, in 1975
the United Nations Environmental Program proposed to extend the
Treaty's environmental protection provisions with respect to mineral resource exploitation. Program administrators representing
243
One part of the Treaty System, the Agreed Measures, provides that "[e]ach participating Government shall prohibit within the Treaty Area the killing, wounding,
capturing or molesting of any native mammal or native bird, or any attempt at any such
act, except in accordance with a permit." Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Fauna and Flora,June 2-13, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, 998, T.I.A.S. No. 6058, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.LA.S. No. 7692 (1973).
244
The Treaty imposes an enforcement obligation upon member states. Article X
states that "[e]ach of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts...
to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or
purposes of the present Treaty." Treaty, supra note 2, art. X.
245 Including the French National Academy of Sciences, the Federation Francaise
des Societes de Protection de la Nature, and Greenpeace International. Joyner, supra
note 242, at 269.
246 Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, Background Paperon the French Airfield at
Pointe Geologie, Antarctica8 (Mar. 1, 1985) (mimeographed), cited in Joyner, supra note 242,
at 270.
A more recent example of the Treaty System's inadequate environmental protection measures involved the grounding of the Argentine supply ship, BahiaParaiso,in the
Bismarck Strait in January 1989. The resulting oil spill created an oil slick 8-12 kilometers long, and caused significant damage to the local ecosystem. In particular, the oil
spill destroyed a three-year research project on the effects of ultraviolet radiation on the
food chain which was being carried out at the United States Palmer Station. The international response was almost nonexistent. In a House of Commons debate considering
the accident, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs stated: "There are no specific treaty obligations which require the United Kingdom
[a consultative party] to clean up oil spills in Antarctica and there are no resources
deployed in Antarctica for that purpose." See Redgwell, supra note 5, at 475 n.9 (quoting
149 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 143 (W.A.) (14 Mar. 1989)).
247 See F. AUBURN, supra note 15, at 120-25.
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states which were consultative parties to the Treaty blocked the proposal. 2 4 8 Similarly, the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
(SCAR) 249 proposed in 1973 and 1985 that mandatory environmental impact assessments be required for any major construction project in Antarctica. 25 0 The consultative parties rejected these
proposals and instead adopted their own nonbinding, noncompul-

sory recommendation covering the same subject matter. 25 '
2.

Cooperation Among Treaty Parties

Treaty System proponents also praise the high degree of cooperation among member states that has prevailed under the current
regime. 252 Central to this element of cooperation is the requirement that the consultative parties make every important decision by
consensus. 2 53 The significance of this cooperation must, however,
be critically examined in light of the fact that the consultative parties
are a self-selecting group. If participation were indeed open, as is
often claimed, 25 4 unanimity would in many instances be unattainable given the polarization of national interests along multiple axes
within the international community. 25 5 This suggests that consenId. at 235.
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, or SCAR, is an arm of the International Council of Scientific Unions charged with coordinating scientific activity
throughout the Antarctic region. See Sollie, supra note 45, at 22 n.15.
250 The proposed mandatory environmental impact assessments would have required circulation among participating governments and approval of their adequacy.
Barnes, supra note 241, at 243.
251
At the Eight Consultative Meeting in Oslo, Norway, representatives of the consultative parties adopted a code of conduct outlining "recommended procedures," and
suggested that their governments "[t]o the greatest extent feasible... observe the code
of conduct." Recommendation VIII-11: Man's Impact on the Antarctic Environment, reprintedin
W. BusH, supra note 51, at 324-26. In contrast to the mandatory assessments required
by the SCAR proposal, these recommended procedures were nonbinding.
252
See Trolle-Anderson, supra note 71, at 57 (Under the Treaty System "[e]ighteen
countries with diverse political and economic systems successfully cooperate in managing all matters concerning the southern continent."); Vicuna, supra note 212, at 66
("The Antarctic Treaty system is essentially a pragmatic formulation deprived of ideological connotations of any sort which enables it to sustain a continued process of compromise and adaptation.").
253
During the negotiation of the Treaty itself, full consensus was required. Sollie,
supra note 45, at 31. Article IX of the Treaty provides that all "measures in furtherance
of the principles and objectives of the Treaty" must be adopted by consensus. Treaty,
supra note 2, art. IX, para. 1. Furthermore, applications for admission to the consultative group must have the unanimous approval of the current consultative parties. See
supra note 74. In consultative meetings, all recommendations of the consultative parties
must be adopted by consensus. Rules of Procedureof Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings,
July 10, 1961, para. 23, reprintedin W. BusH, supra note 51, at 117. Finally, any amendment or modification to the Treaty must have the unanimous approval of the consultative parties. Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII, para. 1(a).
254
See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
255 For example, polarization inheres in the dichotomy between industrialized and
248
249
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sus under the Treaty System is possible only because of the uniform
alignment of interests among the consultative parties. Furthermore,
in order to preserve this form of cooperation the consultative parties must exclude from participation those states that have legitimate but divergent interests. Cooperation under the Treaty System
would surely be a virtue if based upon compromise and conciliation.
However, when it is the product of self-interested exclusionary be25 6
havior, its benefits come at too great a cost.
IV
RECOMMENDATION

A.

Historical Perspective

The Antarctic Treaty system rests upon a series of outmoded
legal principles regarding the acquisition and exercise of territorial
sovereignty. Under the current regime the consultative parties, particularly the twelve original parties to the Treaty, enjoy a privileged
status that can be attributed solely to the fact that they were first to
2 57
invent a legal regime for Antarctica.
This first-come-first-served rationale was appropriate in the
Age of Discovery when the priority was to establish a system of organized appropriation, rather than to allocate limited quantities of
scarce resources. 2 58 The apportionment of lands inhabited by "uncivilized" populations during the period of European colonialism
seems unjust in retrospect, but it was recognized as valid by the European nations involved. 25 9 However, it is inappropriate from both
less-developed nations, between East and West, between mineral importers and mineral
exporters, between aligned and nonaligned states.
256 Finn Sollie has characterized this situation as "a dilemma of critical size in an
organization of special-interest-states with a desire to preserve the identity as well as the

existence of their organization against pressures from common-interest-states with a desire to enforce the principle of universal participation." Sollie, supra note 45, at 21.
257

The Treaty provides that any state may, subsequent to obtaining nonconsultative

status, apply for admission to the consultative group. Several states have, in fact, gained
consultative status through this process. However, only the twelve original parties hold
permanent consultative status, which cannot be lost through lack of activity. Temporary
consultative parties, in contrast, lose their status once their substantial presence in Antarctica lapses. See supra note 73.
The first-come-first-served mentality is also inherent in the territorial claims which
Article IV of the Treaty implicitly recognizes. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying
text. The Convention explicitly recognizes these claims. See supra text accompanying
notes 236-37.
258 During the period of European expansion, when the extent of undiscovered
lands was unknown, "the issues raised related solely to the relationship between the
discoverer and the discovered." Grieg, supra note 114, at 140.
259 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823) (Marshall, CJ.)
("[A]Il the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognised in others, the exclusive right of the discoverer

to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.").
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a legal and political point of view to employ doctrines based upon
discovery and possession to justify the administration of territory
and resources during the post-World War II era. This is an era of
scarce vital resources, requiring a high degree of international cooperation and interdependence. 260 International law must, and inevitably will, adjust to accommodate these new economic and political
26 1
priorities and the Antarctic legal regime must adapt accordingly.
Outmoded principles of territorial acquisition cannot justify the
power that the consultative parties hold. The authority of the parties must be granted through the international community's de facto
recognition of their special position. Yet the recognition granted to
the consultative parties for the limited undertakings of the Treaty
cannot apply to the parties' attempt to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over mineral resources. 262 The element of consensus that is
indispensable to the formation of international law 26 3 does not exist
2 64
with respect to the current regime.
B.

An Alternative Legal Regime for Antarctica

Treaty advocates often assert that despite the defects of the current legal regime, there is no viable alternative.2 65 This view ignores the fact that from the outset of the Antarctic legal debate,
commentators have proposed alternative regimes 2 66 including trus260 The basic intuition underlying the call for increased international cooperation is
by no means a novel one. Adam Smith recognized that "[w]hat improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconvenience to the whole. No
society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members
are poor and miserable." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed. 1976). It is only that the circumstances
have become more compelling.
261
The need for the international legal system to adjust to shifting priorities has
also been recognized in the context of ocean resources. See P. SREENIVASA RAO, THE
PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEAN RESOURCES: A CRITiqUE OF THE CONTEMPORARY LAw OF THE
SEA IX-X, 26-7 (1975).
See supra text accompanying notes 212-18.
262
263
See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
264 Nor may the consultative parties rely upon the pre-Treaty sovereignty claims as a
basis for authority, since the claims were never widely recognized as legitimate. See supra
note 67.
265
See Vicuna, supra note 212, at 72-73. In the legal context, the argument is often a
circular one. Vicuna suggests that if the consultative parties do not have the right to
control Antarctica, that right must belong to the international community; yet the "international community does not have either the record of activity or the element of sovereignty to support such a right or title." Id. at 73. This argument's weakness lies in its
application of traditional standards of sovereignty and possession, upon whose abandonment internationalization largely rests. See also Trolle-Anderson, supra note 71, at 64
(the current Treaty System "is built on an extremely fine and delicate political and legal
balance which it would be impossible to recreate in the political climate of today").
266 For a discussion of early proposals, see F. VICUNA, supra note 18, at 5-8; supra
notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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teeship, 26 7 international ownership, 268 and the creation of a world
park. 2 69 Most of these proposals presumed that the international
community has a right to share in the benefits to be derived from
Antarctica. 270 In recent years, increased recognition of the international community's interest in Antarctica has manifested itself in the
development of the common heritage principle.
1.

The Common Heritage Principle

The principle of the "common heritage of mankind" developed
in the context of the rapid political and economic changes that took
place in the latter part of this century. 2 7 1 With roots in the legal
doctrine of mare liberum, or freedom of the high seas, the common
heritage principle has three main tenets: first, the replacement of
rights to ownership with rights to use; second, international management and control over the resource in question; and third, shar72
ing the wealth resulting from such use.2
The common heritage principle has yet to gain universal acceptance as a rule of international law;2 73 however, this does not
267 An Antarctic trusteeship for the benefit of the international community was discussed in the United Nations in 1947-1948. See Wolfrum, supra note 207, at 145. In
1959, Jessup and Taubenfeld proposed a similar arrangement. PnILIP C.JESSUP & HowARDJ. TAUBENFELD, CONTROL FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 11 (1961).
268 For a discussion of early commentators favoring international ownership of Antarctica, see F. VICUNA, supra note 18, at 6.
269
The transformation of Antarctica into a world park has been favored primarily by
environmentalists. SeeJAMES N. BARNES, LET'S SAVE ANTARCTICA 30 (1982); see alsoJohn
Warren Kindt, Ice-Covered Areas and the Law of the Sea: Issues Involving Resource Exploitation
and the Antarctic Environment, XIV BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 27 (1988).
270 F. VICUNA, supra note 18, at 6.

271 Other products of this rapidly developing political and economic climate, emphasizing international cooperation, are the New International Economic Order and the
"law of social interdependence." On the former, see POLrICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Ervin Laszlo &Joel Kurtzman eds.
1981); THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Karl P. Sauvant & Hajo Hasenpflug

eds. 1977); THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE
(Pradip K. Ghosh ed. 1984). On the latter, see Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.CJ.
116, 149 (Alvarez opinion) ("It is evident that for the traditional individualistic regime
on which social life has hitherto been founded, there is being substituted more and more
a new regime, a regime of interdependence, and that, consequently, the law of social
interdependence is taking the place of the old individualistic law."); Pinto, supra note
217, at 166.
272 Note, supra note 159, at 536.
273 See Remarks by Christopher C. Joyner, Who Has the Right of Exploitation, and the
Right to Prevent Exploitation, of the Minerals in Antarctica?, 79 Am. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 58,
62-67 (1985) (panel discussion) ("As an international law principle, [the common heritage of mankind] falls short." Id. at 67); Scharnhorst Miller, The Impact of UNCLOS III on
the Antarctic Regime, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE, supra note 4, at 171 (Of statements advocating the common heritage principle, Muller says that "it would seem to go too far
considering these opinions as a testimony of a well established principle of international
law."); Gillian D. Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty System: Some JurisdictionalProblems, in THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME, supra note 4, at 88, 98-104.
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mean that it is irrelevant to the current legal debate over Antarctica. 2 74 The development of international law is a gradual process. 2 75 International law often lags behind changes in the
underlying political and economic order it reflects.2 7 6 Trends in the
development of the law must therefore be interpreted to determine
which principles should guide the creation of prospective legal
regimes.
The common heritage principle gained momentum during the
1970s. 2 77 It is now widely recognized as a valid conceptual ideal. 2 78
The current debate over the common heritage principle concerns
274
One Antarctic commentator has recognized that "if legal systems are to survive,
they must be dynamic and flexible. Most especially, international law must address new
international ideologies and recent concerns for Antarctica." Triggs, supra note 273, at
104.
275 The lex lata must be objectively verifiable by reference to actual state practice and
judicial pronouncements. However, the "task of verifying the lexlata does not preclude
the witnessing of the gradual emergence of a rule of law in its formative stage." Cheng,
supra note 196, at 514.
276 See Bradley Larschan & Bonnie C. Brennan, The Common Heritageof Mankind Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983). As these authors
observed:
The development of international law is a slow process. The time which
elapses from the juncture when an issue demanding a legal solution is
perceived until that point when concerned parties agree to be bound by a
specific legal document or doctrine may be measured in years, decades or
even centuries.
Id. at 305.
277 The impetus was provided by the 1973 Nonaligned Summit in Algiers. At that
meeting, the demands of the Nonaligned movement and the "Group of 77" less-developed countries were presented in a comprehensive package which advocated a "new
international economic order." The New International Economic Order proposes a restructuring of the dominant economic order established by the developed market economies during the post-World War II period. Emphasis is placed on development of third
world economies. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 271, at 3-15.
278
The Convention itself explicitly acknowledges the basic obligations inherent in
the common heritage principle. Paragraph 13 of the preamble states that "the effective
regulation of Antarctic mineral resource activities is in the interest of the international
community as a whole." Convention, supra note 1, at preamble. The Convention further declares that "participation in Antarctic mineral resource activities should be open
to all States which have an interest in such activities and subscribe to a regime governing
them and that the special situation of developing country Parties to the regime should
be taken into account." Id
Commentators, including Treaty advocates, have generally reached the same conclusion. See Francioni, supra note 24, at 171 (The common heritage principle "has become the leitmotif in the progressive development of international law governing the use
of areas beyond national jurisdiction."); Joyner, supra note 273, at 67 ("In substantial
part the treaty system is operating to promote basic [common heritage of mankind]
objectives in Antarctica."); Wolfrum, supra note 207, at 147 ("Due to the interdependency which governs the relations between states, the principle of solidarity among nations has evolved as a leading principle of international law."). But see Milller, supra note
273, at 171 ("As to the common heritage concept it must be pointed out that the United
Nations have not declared it to be a universal principle applicable to all spaces beyond
generally recognized national sovereignty.").

CORNELL LI W REVIEW

762

[Vol. 76:722

the extent to which it has attained the status of a formalized rule of

law279 (lex lata), as opposed to a merely desirable rule of law (lex

ferenda). 28 0 Although the common heritage principle is not conclusively identified as lex lata, its widespread recognition as exferenda
suggests its status as an emerging principle of customary international law. 28 1 In order to crystallize into a binding rule of customary
law, it must be affirmed by state practice and opiniojuri. 28 2 Past at-

tempts to substantiate the common heritage principle have not been
completely successful. One must examine the reasons underlying
this failure in order to assess the implications for the principle's potential validity.
2.

Past Implementation of the Common Heritage Principle

The common heritage principle is explicitly embodied in two
significant international agreements: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS III),283 and the 1979
279 Proponents of the Treaty System often concede the validity of the common heritage principle as a moral concept, yet insist that it is not binding international law. See
Joyner, supra note 273, at 66 ("As yet [the common heritage principle] is not a principle
of international law. It is a philosophical notion with the potential to emerge and crystallize as a norm."); Triggs, supra note 273, at 99 ("the notion of a common heritage is,
at most, a principle rather than a set of rules"); Note, supra note 159, at 539 ("Although
the common heritage doctrine is arguably a developing principle of international law, it
is not yet binding.").
Others consider the common heritage principle to be binding international law. See
Jorge Castaneda, The Resources of the Seabed, in POLITICAL AND INsTrruTiONAL ISSUES OF
THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 271, at 34-36; Pinto, supra note
217, at 165-67; Wolfrum, supra note 207, at 147 (Wolfrum, however, denies that it is
applicable to Antarctica).
280 Lex lata refers to the law as it is, in objectively verifiable form. Lexferenda refers to
the law as it should be. Consensus as to the lexferenda usually precedes the formation of
lex lata. See Cheng, supra note 197, at 514.
281 The debate over the emergence of a customary rule of law may become a circular
one. For example, supporters of the current Antarctic regime may contend that no customary rule of law mandates application of the common heritage principle to Antarctica.
To support this contention, they may in turn point to the absence of such application in
state practice or opiniojuris. Such practice and opinions, however, are themselves necessary to the creation of a customary rule. If this argument were accepted, the prospect of
an emergent rule of law would be effectively foreclosed. In order to avoid such foreclosure, weight must be given to the exferenda-the recognition that the principle should
be applied. The process of emergence is not automatic; initiative must be taken at some
point.
282
See supra text accompanying notes 196-204.
283
UNCLOS III, supra note 13. UNCLOS III was the product of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, convened in 1973. This conference, and the
two that preceded it, were primarily concerned with the conflict between freedom of the
high seas and the attempt to expand exclusive national jurisdiction over ocean areas. See
INTERNA'IONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 119, at 157-71.
Although the consultative parties were successful in keeping the Antarctic question
off the agenda at the Law of the Sea Conference, the analogy between Antarctica and the
deep seabed was nevertheless widely drawn. See Tullio Treves, The United Nations General

1991]

NOTE-ANTARCTIC CONVENTION

763

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (the Moon Treaty).2 8 4 Given the remote
prospects for practical application of the Moon Treaty, 28 5 the history of UNCLOS III provides the best illustration of an attempt to
implement the common heritage principle.
UNCLOS III declared the deep seabed to be "the common heritage of mankind, to be shared by all nations and not subject to
traditional territorial sovereignty."2 8 6 In furtherance of this principle, and with a view toward regulating the exploitation of the deep
seabed's resources, UNCLOS III created the International Seabed
Authority (the Authority). 28 7 The Authority has two major func-

tions: first, to determine the terms and conditions of access to mineral resources, 28 8 and second, to undertake deep seabed mining on

9
its own behalf through its operating arm, the Enterprise.28

UNCLOS III also adopted development policies intended to faciliAssembly, Antarcticaand the Law of the Sea Convention, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ANTARCTICA 282-85 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds. 1987). The President of the
Law of the Sea Conference, in his capacity as Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka,
declared to the General Assembly that Antarctica is "still an area of the planet where
opportunities remain for constructive and peaceful co-operation on the part of the international community for the common good of all rather than for the benefit of a few."
U.N. Doc. A30/PV/2380, at 15-16. The question of Antarctica was formally presented
to the General Assembly by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, who, in heralding the "Malaysian initiative," stated that "[l]ike the seas and the seabeds, these uninhabited lands
belong to the international community. The countries presently claiming them must
give them up so that either the United Nations administer these lands or the present
occupants act as trustees for the nations of the world." U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.10 (1982).
284
U.N. Doc. A/34/664 (1979) [hereinafter the Moon Treaty]. The Moon Treaty
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979, and became effective on
July 11, 1984. The Moon Treaty prohibits the threat or use of force on the Moon, and
provides for freedom of scientific activity, notice of unilateral activities, and the undertaking of an international regime providing for "equitable sharing by all States Parties in
the benefits derived from [the Moon's] resources." Id. art. 11, para. 7(d).
285
The Moon Treaty is for obvious reasons both more general, and less easy to
envision in actual operation than UNCLOS III. The Moon Treaty provides, for example, that "[i]n exploring and using the moon, States Parties shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment." Moon Treaty, supra note
284, art. 7, para. 1.
286 UNCLOS III, supra note 13, art. 136. Article 140 declares that activities in the
deep seabed are to be "carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole." Id. art. 140,
para. 1. Compare Convention, supra note 1, at preamble, para. 13 ("the effective regulation of Antarctic mineral resource activities is in the interest of the international community as a whole"). Article 140 of UNCLOS III also provides that regulation of sea-bed
activities shall take "into particular consideration the interests and needs of developing
States." UNCLOS III, supra note 13, art. 140, para. 1.Compare Convention, supra note 1,
at preamble, para. 12 ("the special situation of developing country Parties to the regime
should be taken into account").
287 UNCLOS III, supra note 13, art. 156-85.
288 Id. art. 157, para. I ("The Authority is the organization through which States
Parties shall... organize and control activities in the [seabed], particularly with a view to
administering the resources of the [seabed].").
289 Id art. 170.
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tate wealth redistribution in favor of less developed states. Accord290
ingly, UNCLOS III contains provisions for production ceilings,
compulsory technology transfers, 2 9' and centralized price
29 2
controls.
Although a clear majority of negotiating states and the United
Nations General Assembly approved the final text of UNCLOS III,
the agreement has not been ratified by many individual states. 2 93 In
this respect, the undertaking may be deemed a failure, particularly
since none of the industrialized nations who possess the capability
to undertake deep seabed mining have supported UNCLOS III.294
The industrialized nations had a number of specific objections
to the final provisions of UNCLOS 111.295 These objections relate
mostly to the implementation of policies that were perceived as
unduly favoring the special interests of third world nations 296 and
land-based mineral exporters. 29 7 Among the points of contention
were the compulsory technology transfers intended to enable
underdeveloped states to participate in deep seabed mining, 298 production quotas intended to support the world market for seabed
minerals thereby protecting land-based producers, 2 99 and the implementation of centralized mechanisms for price-fixing and resource allocation, which were inconsistent with the free market
290

Id. art. 151.
Id. art. 144.
Id. art. 150, para. f.
A total of 159 states have signed the agreement. As of December 31, 1986, however, only 32 states had ratified UNCLOS III. U.N. Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law
of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue 1, Mar. 1987, 1.
294
Among the 32 states ratifying UNCLOS III, the only European nations are Iceland and Yugoslavia. The only Asian states that have ratified are Fiji, the Philippines,
Bahrain, Iraq, Indonesia, and Kuwait. The remaining ratifying states are in either the
Latin American or African regional group. The United States has neither signed nor
ratified the final agreement, although it did sign the final act of the Law of the Sea Conference which produced UNCLOS III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYsTEM, supra note 119, at
158-64.
295
See Edward Dangler, An Ocean Miner's View of the Draft Convention, 3 N.Y.L. ScH.J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 27 (1981); Marlene Dubow, The Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea: Questions of Equityfor American Business, 4 Nw.J: INT'L L. & Bus. 172 (1982);
Wayne R. Smith, Law of the Sea Treaty: Report on the Enterprise, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 51 (1981); Per Magnus Wijkman, UNCLOS and the Redistributionof Ocean Wealth,
291
292
293

16J. WORLD TRADE L. 27 (1982).
296
See Smith, supra note 295, at 55-58 ("The industrialized countries claim that the
Authority, as now designed, will be guided by the tyranny of the majority; namely, the
developing countries." Id. at 55).
297
See Lawrence L. Herman, The Niceties of Nickel-Canada and the Production Ceiling
Issue at the Law of the Sea Conference, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 265, 272-73 (1979).
298
Such participation could only occur at the expense of the technologically developed nations. Dangler, supra note 295, at 35-36; Dubow, supra note 295, at 190-92.
299 See David Hegwood, Deep Seabed Mining: Alternative Schemes for ProtectingDeveloping
Countriesfrom Adverse Impacts, GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 173, 183-85 (1982); Wijkman, supra
note 295, at 39-42.
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policies of Western nations.3 0 0 The industrialized nations charged
that these provisions would both destroy their incentive for undertaking deep seabed mining3 0 ' and restrict access to vital
302
resources.
Some commentators have suggested that the failure of
UNCLOS III demonstrates the inapplicability of a common heritage
regime to Antarctica.3 0 3 It is important, however, to distinguish between the essential validity of the common heritage principle and
the outcome of past attempts at implementation. The publicly expressed objections of the industrialized nations to UNCLOS III
rested on narrow grounds, relating to specific substantive provisions.3 0 4 These provisions of UNCLOS III, however, are not essential to the implementation of the common heritage principle;
therefore, the failure of UNCLOS III is not a condemnation of the
common heritage principle itself.30 5 Furthermore, one may structure a common heritage regime for Antarctica that avoids these
pitfalls.
3. A Common Heritage Regime for Antarctica
The essential elements of the common heritage principle provide that areas deemed part of the common heritage of mankind are
not subject to national jurisdiction, and that the benefits derived
therefrom must inure to the international community. 30 6 As applied
to Antarctica, the principle formalizes the perception that the entire
international community has a legitimate interest in Antarctica.
This perception is explicitly expressed by both the Treaty and the
300 See Wijkman, supra note 295, at 38-39 ("Negotiations over the deep seabed regime arrayed developing countries in a cohesive group against most developed market
economies, and each side offered proposals reflecting its dominant economic and ideological interests." Id. at 38.).
301 See Dubow, supra note 295, at 186-90; Mary Victoria White, The Common Heritageof
Mankind: An Assessment, 14 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 509, 533 (1982).
302 The United States based its public objections on the ground that it was denied
guaranteed access to minerals essential to national security. See Note of January 13,
1986, from the United States Mission to the United Nations Addressed to the ScretaryGeneral of the United Nations, in U.N. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 7, Apr. 1986, at 74.
303 See Muiller, supra note 273, at 171-72; Bergin, supra note 32, at 39-40.
304 See supra text accompanying notes 295-302.
305 This does not deny that further objections may be raised on other grounds.
However, to the extent that the past failure of UNCLOS III is used as evidence of the
nonviability of the common heritage principle, the probative value of such failure must
be limited to the specific grounds of objection.
306 See supra text accompanying note 272. On the application of the basic tenets of
the common heritage principle to Antarctica, seeJoyner, supra note 273, at 63-64. See
also Edward E. Honnold, Thaw in InternationalLaw? Rights in Antarctica under the Law of
Common Spaces, 87 YALE LJ. 804 (1978).
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Convention.3 0 7 The current legal regime for Antarctica is nevertheless fundamentally inconsistent with these principles. Territorial
sovereignty3 0 8 and exclusive jurisdiction over Antarctic mineral resources 30 9 cannot be reconciled with the interests of the global
community.
The recognition of Antarctica as the common heritage of mankind could be accomplished either under a modified Treaty System
or by the implementation of an entirely new legal regime. The essential feature of either alternative would be a system of open participation. Incorporation of this single feature would recognize the
legitimate, vested interest that all nations have in Antarctica. Furthermore, if all interested parties are given a voice in determining
matters of policy, the resulting legal regime can claim the tacit ac3 10
ceptance of the international community.
The Treaty System's current regime could be remedied by eliminating the two-tiered membership structure utilized by both the
Treaty3 1 1 and the Convention.3 12 All states expressing an interest
in Antarctica should be invited to participate in the policymaking
process.3 1 3 Administration could be carried out by a limited body
analogous to the Resources Commission established under the Convention. 3 14 Such a body, however, must be representative of the
overall membership, and accordingly, the election procedure must
3 15
allow equal voting by all member states.
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 132-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
310 By allowing universal participation under the auspices of the United Nations, the
Law of the Sea Conference gave effect to the most important element of the common
heritage principle. In this respect, UNCLOS III differs fundamentally from the current
Antarctic legal regime. Recognition of the common heritage principle was not a product
of the Conference, but a precondition to its existence.
311 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
312 See supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
313 Such an arrangement promises to be unwieldy; in fact, the United Nations General Assembly is often criticized on this basis. Impracticality, however, is a relative concept. It is not thought unduly impractical for some 170 million Americans to elect a
single President, or to approve an amendment to the Constitution. The extent of inconvenience must be measured in terms of the value sought to be attained.
314 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
315 A one-state, one-vote procedure is preferable to the current exclusionary structure of the Treaty System in that it reflects democratic principles as they currently exist
in the United Nations. This political apportionment of votes, however, is fundamentally
inconsistent with the common heritage principle. Given that the principle emphasizes
the benefit of mankind, and not the community of political states, a decisionmaking procedure that apportioned votes according to population would be more equitable.
Such a scheme would be more consistent with the common heritage principle, yet is
for now beyond the practical capacity of current international institutions. Moreover, it
probably demands too much of our ability to surrender long-held political conceptions.
Perhaps a compromise position could be achieved, incorporating a bicameral legislative
307
308
309
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The economic benefits of Antarctic mineral resource activities,
as part of the common heritage, must inure to the international
community. A levy imposed on those undertaking development of
mineral resources would accomplish this objective.3 16 The amount
of this levy and the distribution of its proceeds would be determined
by negotiation among the participating states.3 17 Although the history of UNCLOS III suggests that the process of reaching an accord
on this point will be an arduous task, it also provides a cautionary
illustration of the need for compromise. In this sense, UNCLOS III
may have laid valuable groundwork for future attempts at international cooperation in managing the earth's scarce resources.
It is not the purpose of this Note to propose particular substantive provisions, or to develop a negotiating stance for a particular
interest group. The participation of the international community
should determine the exact content of an Antarctic mineral resources regime. The full implementation of an Antarctic legal regime consistent with the common heritage principle must, by
definition, flow from a system of open participation.
CONCLUSION

The Convention appears at a time when the future of the entire
Treaty System is being considered by the consultative parties, under
the watchful eye of the international community. Although the current regime is of indefinite duration, the Treaty provides that upon
system similar to the United States Congress, in which representation is based on both
population and statehood.
316 A levy on operators does not presuppose a strictly centralized economic system
such as that to which industrialized nations objected in UNCLOS III. See supra text accompanying note 300. Given that the common heritage principle recognizes vested
legal interests in the international community amounting to ownership, a levy on operators could be analogized to the rents a property owner may charge for use of his or her
property. In the context of Antarctic mineral resource activities, the capitalist analog
would be a mining lease.
The United States has not objected to a limited form of revenue sharing. Dubow,
supra note 295, at 188-90. The United States has, in fact, submitted its own proposals on
this point. See, e.g., Elliot L. Richardson, Seabed Mining and Law of the Sea, DEP'T ST.
BULL., Dec. 1980, at 60, 61.
317 It may be assumed that less developed states would possess a controlling major-

ity, if they so align themselves, and could therefore demand an unreasonable share.
This would be countered, however, by the fact that only industrialized nations are likely
to possess the technology to undertake mineral resource activities in Antarctica. In order for anyone to benefit, an accommodation would have to be reached. Francioni suggests that the amount of such levies "would be determined so as to guarantee an
equitable and well-balanced relationship between the profits that investing companies or
states reasonably expect from the Antarctic venture and the contribution to development that nonindustrial states legitimately expect from the recovery of nonrenewable
resources in a common space." Francioni suggests that a fair amount would be 5-10%
of profits. Francioni, supra note 24, at 174 n.41.
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the expiration of thirty years from its effective date, any consultative
party may initiate a comprehensive procedure for amendment and
review of the Treaty system. 3 18 This option becomes available in
1991.319 The action taken at that time is likely to be influenced by

the fate of the Convention.
The Antarctic Treaty system need not be abandoned, but it
should be amended to adhere to the common heritage principle
whose basic tenets it purports to embody.3 20 The amendments
should provide for a truly open system of membership, and should
allow the international community to participate meaningfully in decisions regarding Antarctica. In accordance with the common heritage principle, increased international participation should result in
some form of revenue sharing.
Concepts such as the common heritage principle have, in this
country, invariably been clothed in the mantle of idealism. This
Note proposes that the contrary is actually the case: that the common heritage principle is a reflection of current realities. This century has witnessed a shift in priorities from appropriation to
interdependence, rooted in as yet inescapable facts of geography
and demographics. The legal order must adapt to these changes.
If the current Antarctic Treaty regime fails to adapt in the face of
international legal and political developments, "reality will surpass
'3 2 1
it, and render it ineffective."
Douglas M. Zang

318 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII, para. 2(a). The Treaty does not simply expire pursuant to its own terms, as is sometimes suggested to be the case.
319
The Treaty became effective onJune 23, 1961.
320
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
321
Rfidiger Wolfrum has recognized that a future regime for Antarctica "has to respond to reality, standards as well as facts, otherwise-and this is true for every treaty in

international law-reality will surpass it and render it ineffective." Wolfrum, supra note
207, at 147.

